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Abstract
We examine the quantitative predictions of heterogeneous rm in the context
of the Canada - US Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA) of 1989. We compute pre-
dicted increases in trade ows and measured productivity and compare them to
the post-CUSFTA increases observed in the data. Most models predict increases
in measured productivity that are too low by an order of magnitude relative to
predicted increases in trade ows. A multi-product rm extension that allows for
within-rm productivity increases has the potential to reconcile model predictions
with the data.
Since the seminal contribution by Melitz (2003), heterogeneous rm models have be-
come a widely used instrument in the toolkitof international economists. These models
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were motivated by a number of stylized facts: (i) the existence of large productivity dif-
ferences among rms within the same industry; (ii) the higher productivity of exporting
rms as compared to non-exporting rms; (iii) the large levels of resource reallocations
across rms within industries following trade liberalization reforms; and (iv) the result-
ing gains in aggregate industry productivity. In a generalization of the Krugman (1979,
1980) model, the introduction of within-industry productivity heterogeneity and beach-
head costs enables this class of models to produce equilibria and comparative statics along
the lines of these facts.
While these models are thus qualitatively consistent with available empirical evidence,
a thorough evaluation of their quantitative predictions with regards to trade liberalization
is still at an early stage. This is despite the fact that the modelsquantitative predictions
for the link between trade liberalization and changes in aggregate productivity or trade
ows are of rst-order importance for economic policy and welfare analysis. In this paper,
we attempt to provide such an evaluation. We go beyond the stylized facts listed above
and ask to what extent a range of heterogeneous rm models in the tradition of Melitz
(2003) are able to quantitatively replicate the changes in trade ows and productivity
associated with a specic trade liberalization episode.
We do so in the context of the Canada - US Free Trade Agreement of 1989 (CUSFTA).
As we explain in more detail in Section 2 below, CUSFTA is an ideal setting for the
quantitative evaluation of trade liberalization episodes.1 First, it was a pure trade
liberalization in the sense that it was not accompanied by any other important economic
reform, nor was it a response to a macroeconomic shock. Second, it was also largely
unanticipated since its ratication by the Canadian parliament was considered to be
uncertain as late as November 1988.2 Third, the main instrument of liberalization were
tari¤ cuts which are easily quantiable and have a direct theoretical counterpart in all
the models we analyse. Finally, there is a substantial amount of reduced-form evidence
that CUSFTA has had a signicant causal impact on both trade ows and productivity
1Also see Treer (2004).
2See Breinlich (2008) for a discussion of this point. Frizzell et al. (1989) provide a detailed account
of the political context in which the agreement was signed.
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in the Canadian manufacturing sector (e.g. Head and Ries, 1999, 2001; Treer, 2004).
The goal of our analysis is to evaluate to which extent di¤erent versions and exten-
sions of Melitzs heterogeneous rm model can replicate the magnitude of trade ow and
productivity increases we observe in Canada in the post-CUSFTA period (1988-1996).
The baseline model we use for our analysis is a version of Chaney (2008), who extends
Melitz (2003) to multiple asymmetric countries and industries as well as asymmetric
trade barriers between countries. We write the models equilibrium conditions in changes
following Dekle et al. (2008). This allows us to express predicted increases in trade ows
and measured productivity as functions of initial trade shares, the actual observed tari¤
cuts as well as a small number of additional parameters. We compute these predictions
for around 200 Canadian manufacturing sectors and compare means, variances and co-
variances of these increases across sectors to the trade ow and productivity increases
observed in the data. Throughout, we pay close attention to construct model predictions
which are directly comparable to the data. We do so by mimicking the procedures used
by Statistics Canada in computing measured trade and productivity growth as closely as
possible in the construction of our theoretical moments.3
Our central result is that our benchmark model is inherently incapable of matching
both trade and productivity increases. This is true when we use sectorial parameter
estimates obtained from other data sources, or when we choose parameters to minimize
deviations between theoretical and empirical moments via a simple GMM procedure. The
predicted increase in trade ows for a given change in tari¤s is always much too large
relative to the predicted increase in measured productivity. Put di¤erently, if we choose
parameters to match trade ows, the model substantially underpredicts the growth in
measured productivity we observe in the data.
We explore the robustness of our results in a number of ways, such as using di¤erent
approaches to computing measured productivity growth or modelling tari¤ cuts in the
model. We also investigate whether the baseline models poor performance is due to the
fact that it abstracts from many important real-world determinants of trade and produc-
3Section 3 and Appendix A discuss in detail how measured real productivity growth arises in our
modeling frameworks despite the presence of xed markups.
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tivity growth (e.g., technological progress unrelated to trade liberalization, or changes in
non-tari¤ barriers and physical transport costs). We rst show that allowing for contem-
poraneous changes in other trade barriers cannot resolve the fundamental mismatch of
trade and productivity growth. Secondly, we remove a number of sources of variation
from the data which are absent from our model. For example, we rst-di¤erence the data
to remove time-invariant trends in productivity and trade ow increases. We also project
the data on sectorial-level tari¤ cuts as in Treer (2004) and use the predicted values for
a comparison to our models predictions. That is, we only use the variation in the data
associated with tari¤ cuts, which is directly comparable to the key mechanism in our
model (where tari¤ reductions are the only exogenous driver of trade and productivity
growth).4 These procedures lead to a better t of the model to the data, but the overall
discrepancies remain large.
Having established the inability of our baseline model to simultaneously match trade
and productivity increases, we ask which variations in modelling features bring the
models predictions closer to the data. We experiment with versions of our baseline model
allowing for free entry, tradable intermediate inputs, general equilibrium e¤ects operating
through wages, and endogenous rm-level productivity through adjustments in product
scope as in Bernard et al. (2011). We nd that free entry and general equilibrium e¤ects
do not markedly improve the models performance. Introducing tradable intermediates
helps somewhat, but formal over-identication tests in our GMM framework still reject
this model variant. The only model that is capable of providing a good t to the data
and of passing our over-identication tests is the multi-product rm extension. We in-
terpret these results as evidence for the need to explicitly model within-rm productivity
increases when constructing quantitative trade models capable of explaining rst-order
features of trade liberalization episodes. This is in line with a number of recent studies
highlighting within-rm productivity e¤ects in response to freer trade, in the context of
CUSFTA but also of other trade liberalization episodes (e.g., Bustos, 2011; Lileeva and
4We always perform the same transformation on the actual and the model-generated data to preserve
comparability. We explain this approach in more detail in Section 4.
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Treer, 2011).5
Our research contributes to several related strands in the literature. The rst are
papers concerned with the design and testing of a new generation of computable gen-
eral equilibrium (CGE) models (e.g., Balistreri et al., 2011; Corcos et al. 2012). This
new generation of CGE models tries to improve the predictive performance of earlier
CGE models by explicitly modelling rm-level heterogeneity.6 Our paper highlights a
fundamental problem many of these models face when trying to predict the e¤ects of a
reduction of trade barriers the inability to match both trade and productivity increases,
the two variables which have been the focus of most existing theoretical and empirical
analyses of trade liberalization episodes. We also contribute to this literature by per-
forming a comparative evaluation of a wide range of popular trade models, rather than
focusing on the performance of one particular version. Finally, we look at both within-
and out-of-sample predictions and employ formal statistical tests to evaluate model per-
formance, rather than only comparing the model predictions and data in a relatively ad
hoc fashion.
Secondly, we contribute to the rapidly growing literature on quantitative trade mod-
els (e.g., Eaton and Kortum, 2002; Alvarez and Lucas, 2007; Hsieh and Ossa, 2011;
Levchenko and Zhang, 2011; Arkolakis et al., 2012; Ossa, 2012; and Costinot and
Rodríguez-Clare, 2013, for a recent overview). One of the key purposes of these pa-
pers is to compute the gains from trade in di¤erent gravity-type models and to relate the
magnitude of the predicted gains to specic model features. Obviously, the usefulness
of these exercises depends crucially on the empirical validity of the underlying modelling
frameworks in terms of their quantitative (rather than just qualitative) predictions. We
point out that a class of widely used quantitative trade models has di¢ culties matching
basic adjustment patterns to freer trade, and show which model modications provide a
5Given that the number of free parameters in the above models varies, we also look at the out-
of-sample predictions of our models. That is, we estimate parameters on the pre-liberalization period
(1980-1988) and compare the models predictions for the post-liberalization (1988-1996) period, thus
controlling for potential problems of overtting. Still, we nd that the multiproduct extension of our
baseline model performs best.
6See Kehoe (2005) for an evaluation of the (poor) quantitative performance of some of these earlier
models.
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better t to the data.
There is a also a much smaller number of papers which have recently evaluated other
aspects of the quantitative performance of models in the tradition of Melitz (2003). For
example, Lawless (2009) and Eaton et al. (2011) note the inability of these models to
explain several features of rm-level data such as the fact that rms do not enter mar-
kets according to an exact hierarchy or that exporters sell more at home than predicted.
Armenter and Koren (2014) show that Melitz-type models cannot match both the size
and the share of exporters given the observed distribution of total sales. Chaney (2013)
points out that they are unable to simultaneously match a number of stylized facts re-
garding the distribution of the geographic location and the number of foreign markets
accessed by di¤erent rms. These papers all make important contributions to improving
various quantitative predictions of Melitz-type models in the cross-section; but they do
not provide evidence for the quantitative performance of these models in predicting the
e¤ects of trade liberalization. As we have argued above, we see this aspect as central
for economic policy and welfare analysis, and the success of Melitz-type models in ex-
plaining post-liberalization changes in productivity and trade qualitatively has certainly
contributed to their popularity. Put di¤erently, even if Melitz-type models fail to match
important cross-sectional facts, they might still provide reasonably precise predictions
for the consequences of trade liberalization. Likewise, even if a model matches all rel-
evant cross-sectional facts, it does not automatically follow that its trade liberalization
predictions will be adequate. A good quantitative cross-sectional performance is neither
necessary nor su¢ cient for quantitatively accurate time-series predictions with respect to
trade liberalization and a separate investigation is thus required.7 Finally, we again also
add to this last group of related papers by introducing formal over-identication tests
and an analysis of both within- and out-of-sample predictions.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we provide background
information on CUSFTA and take a rst look at the increases in trade ows and measured
7Milton Friedman famously argued that ... theory is to be judged by its predictive power for the
class of phenomena which it is intended to explain. (Friedman, 1953, p.8). In our view, the central aim
of Melitz-type models is to make sense of, and predictions for, the reaction of an economy to reductions
in trade barriers. Other (cross-sectional) predictions are also relevant but more secondary.
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productivity we observe in the data. Section 3 discusses our baseline model and how
we compute our theoretical predictions. Section 4 evaluates this models quantitative
predictions and shows why the model is inherently incapable of matching our empirical
moments. In Section 5 we discuss di¤erent extensions of our baseline model and show
that allowing for endogenous rm-level productivity is one way of reconciling models of
the class of Melitz (2003) with the evidence. Section 6 concludes.
1 Empirical Setting
Negotiations for CUSFTA started in May 1986, were nalized in October 1987 and the
treaty was signed in early 1988. The agreement came into e¤ect on 1 January 1989, which
was also the date of the rst round of tari¤ cuts. Tari¤s were then phased out over a
period of up to ten years with some industries opting for a swifter phase-out.
Figure 1 shows that these tari¤ reductions were accompanied by strong increases
in Canadian trade ows (imports plus exports to/from the U.S.) and measured labour
productivity.8 The average Canadian trade ow increase over the period 1988 to 1996 was
118%, while the increase in labour productivity was 30%. This compares to growth rates
of only 44% (trade) and 17% (labour productivity) for the pre-liberalisation period, 1980-
1988. Figure 1 also displays a high degree of heterogeneity in trade ow and productivity
changes across the 203 sectors in our data in the post-liberalization period. For example,
industries at the 5th percentile of the distribution of productivity changes observed a
decrease of close to -12% over the 1988-1996 period, or -1.5% per year. In contrast,
industries at the 95th percentile saw productivity increase by over 80% in total or 7.7% per
year. Likewise, trade ow changes range from -14% (-1.9% p.a.) at the 5th percentile to
over +400% (22% p.a.) at the 95th percentile. Using di¤erences-in-di¤erences estimation
and instrumental variables techniques, Treer (2004) demonstrates a causal link between
these changes and the extent of tari¤ cuts across sectors.
8We use data for 203 Canadian manufacturing sectors from Treer (2004), who uses Statistics Canada
as his original data source. We compute growth rates from data expressed in 1992 Canadian dollars using
4-digit industry price and value added deators and the 1992 US-Canadian Dollar exchange rate. Labor
productivity is calculated as value added in production activities divided by total hours worked by
production workers. See section 4 for additional details on data construction.
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In the light of this evidence, we focus on model predictions regarding average changes
in trade and productivity and their dispersion across sectors. This is in line with the view
that models of trade liberalisation should at least correctly predict average increases in
trade and productivity, as well as being able to account for the strong sectorial hetero-
geneity evident in the data.9 Table 1 summarizes our empirical moments. Besides the
mean and the variance of trade ow and productivity increases, we also look at the co-
variance between these increases across sectors. That is, we will be comparing the rst
and second moments of these variables to their theoretical counterparts in our models.
Before moving on to a description of our baseline model, we discuss some possible
objections to our approach of comparing model predictions to empirical moments based
on trade and productivity growth. Most importantly, the only (exogenous) driver of trade
and productivity growth in our models are tari¤ cuts. In contrast, other determinants are
likely to be present in the data, which might make a direct comparison between theoretical
and empirical moments uninformative. We have several replies to this objection.
First, several aspects of CUSFTA suggest that it is a reasonable abstraction to rely
on models with relatively simple, tari¤-reduction driven, data generating processes. In
particular, tari¤ cuts were by far the most important tool of liberalization under CUS-
FTA. In contrast, non-tari¤ barriers remained unchanged after 1988 in the sense that
the corresponding provisions in CUSFTA only amounted to a reconrmation of earlier
multilateral obligations under the General Agreement on Tari¤s and Trade (GATT).10
CUSFTA also had a natural experimentcharacter in the sense that it was not accompa-
nied by any other important economic reform, nor was it a response to a macroeconomic
shock (see Treer, 2004). This implies that the presence of other, unmodelled, deter-
minants of trade and productivity growth should be less important than during other
9Note that this is a less demanding test than asking the model to exactly match trade and productivity
growth in all sectors. As we will see, however, the key problem of most of our models is to get the relative
response of trade and productivity growth right. This is what prevents these models from matching the
data, be it sector-by-sector or on average. A further advantage of relying on moments computed across
sectors is that we can implement formal statistical tests within a GMM framework, once we impose the
necessary cross-sectoral parameter restrictions (see Section 3 below).
10See, in particular, Chapters 5, 6 and 13 of CUSFTA (1988) on National Treatment, Technical
Standards and Government Procurement. All of these measures also have in common that they are not
sector-specic and as such are unlikely to be correlated with tari¤ cuts. (We discuss the issue of omitted
variables correlated with tari¤ reductions below and in Section 4.)
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liberalization episodes, and the resulting deviations between model predictions and data
less substantial.
We think that these points make tari¤-reductions only models a useful starting
point for our evaluation. But the presence of other, unmodelled determinants of trade
and productivity growth in the data is of course still likely. This is why in Section 4
we experiment at length with di¤erent procedures of removing variation from the data
which is likely to be driven by factors absent from our models. Most importantly, we show
that our results go through when we only rely on variation in the data associated with
reductions in tari¤s. Here again, the natural experimentcharacter of CUSFTA is useful
because it makes the variation in tari¤ cuts largely exogenous. Indeed, Treer (2004)
experiments with di¤erent instrumental variable strategies and, using the same tari¤
data as in this paper, nds no evidence for endogeneity problems in the corresponding
Hausman tests.
One remaining concern with relying on tari¤ cuts as the key driver of trade and
productivity growth in our models is that US-Canadian manufacturing tari¤s were already
relatively low in 1988. Treer (2004) discusses this issue at length, and shows that two
factors make it nevertheless plausible that CUSFTA generated the strong observed trade
and productivity responses which he nds and which we have discussed above. While
average Canadian manufacturing tari¤s against the United States were only around 8%
in 1988, this average hid a substantial amount of sectorial heterogeneity. In fact, more
than a quarter of Canadian industries were protected by tari¤s in excess of 10%. These
industries also tended to be characterised by low prot margins, implying that the 1988
tari¤wall was high and that its removal could be expected to lead to important selection
and trade e¤ects within Canada. Similar arguments apply to the import tari¤s faced by
Canadian rms exporting to the United States which also showed a strong variation across
sectors (although the average initial tari¤ was somewhat lower here, at approximately
4%).
Finally, we note that even if a large part of the trade and productivity gains after
1988 was driven by factors correlated with, but distinct from, tari¤ reductions, this is
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unlikely to rescue our baseline and most of our augmented models. For example, we
show in Section 4 that allowing for changes in trade barriers other than tari¤s faces the
same problems of simultaneously matching trade and productivity increases. If we vary
such trade barriers to exactly match trade growth, we still substantially underestimate
productivity growth, and vice versa.
2 Description of Baseline Model
In this section, we outline our baseline model, which is a version of Chaney (2008). We de-
scribe the model setup and how we derive our equilibrium conditions in changes. We then
discuss how to construct theoretical predictions from the model which are comparable to
the empirical moments we observe in the data (see Table 1).11
Model Setup and Equilibrium Conditions
There are many countries, denoted by h and j.12 Each country admits a representative
agent, with quasi-linear preferences
Uj =
X
i2I
mij lnQij + Aj; (1)
where mij > 0 and i denotes industries. Aj denotes consumption of a homogeneous nal
good. Qij denotes a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregate (manufacturing) nal good i:
Qij =
"Z
2 ij
qij()
id
# 1
i
; (2)
where i 2 (0; 1) and i  1= (1  i) denotes the elasticity of substitution between any
two varieties. Choosing good A as the numéraire, utility maximisation on the upper
level yields demand functions Aj = Yj  
P
imij and Eij  PijQij = mij, where Yj is
11Given that this model is a straightforward extension of Chaney (2008), we keep the description
of the model set up to a minimum and devote more space to the construction of the theoretical mo-
ment. Further details about the model are contained in the Online Appendix to this paper (available at
http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~hbrein/TheAppendix_20130717.pdf).
12When considering bilateral variables, we adopt the convention that h and j refer to exporting and
importing countries, respectively.
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total expenditure per consumer. In the manufacturing goods sector, utility maximisation
yields demand function qihj() = pihj ()
 i P i 1ij mij.
The homogeneous good is made with labour l and a linear technology A = lA iden-
tical across countries. Manufacturing varieties are made with the production function
qi () = li (), where  denotes (rm-specic) productivity.  is iid across rms within
an industry. For tractability purposes, we assume  to be distributed Pareto with shape
parameter ai and location parameter k
ij
 . We assume the same shape parameter for an
industry across countries, but allow it to vary across industries. The location parameter is
allowed to vary across industries and countries. Producers of the homogeneous good and
the nal goods Qi operate in a perfectly competitive environment. Producers of varieties
in the manufacturing industry have instead monopoly power over their own varieties.
The homogeneous good is traded freely; supplying it to any market involves no costs.
We consider equilibria in which all countries produce positive amounts of this good, thus
leading to the equalization of wages across countries. (We normalize wages to one.) The
nal goods Qi are not traded; they are produced and supplied under perfectly competitive
conditions. For the varieties produced by the manufacturing industries, we assume iceberg
trade costs, which take the form  ihj = (1 + cihj) (1 + tihj) for j 6= h and  ijj = 1. In
this expression, tari¤ barriers are denoted by tihj and any other trade costs between
country h to country j by cihj. We can safely ignore tari¤ revenue for now, given the
quasi-linear utility assumption above. A manufacturing industry-i rm based in country
h faces a xed cost Fihj of supplying country j. Fixed costs are in terms of the destination
countrys labour. We assume these labour services are provided by a services sector
that operates under perfect competition and with a linear technology that turns one unit
of labour into one unit of the xed cost.13 Fixed and variable trade costs are allowed to
vary across industries. We assume there is no free entry in the manufacturing sectors:
there is a given mass of rms Mih that pick a draw from the distribution of  prior to
any decision. The labour market is perfectly competitive.
13Most of the activities associated with entering foreign markets are best described as service activities,
such as conducting market studies or setting up distribution networks.
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We now proceed to the formal treatment of the model, which consists of three steps:14
(i) First we show how to express the models industry equilibrium outcomes of interest
as functions of the models parameters and of the productivity thresholds typical of
the Melitz model. (ii) We then express the growth rates of these industry outcomes in
terms of the changes in parameter values (the change in trade costs  ihj), the resulting
growth rates of the productivity thresholds, a few of the models parameters (e.g., ai
and i), and the levels of bilateral trade volumes (which subsume the rest of the models
parameters). (iii) Finally, we show how to manipulate the growth rates of the models
equilibrium conditions so as to obtain changes in the productivity thresholds as a function
of changes in  ihj, which will proxy for the trade liberalization, the shape parameter ai,
and the levels of bilateral trade volumes.
The pricing decision over the variety produced by a country-h rm with productivity
 is the usual mark-up over marginal cost. Well-known manipulation of rm revenue and
prot functions yields the following expression for the threshold value of productivity ihj
that leads country-h rms to select into market j:
ihj =
i
i   1
 ihj
Pij

iFihj
mij
 1
i 1
: (3)
The expected revenue and expected prot that a country-h rm obtains in country j,
conditional upon selecting into that market, are respectively
E

rihj ()j  > ihj

=
aii
ai   i + 1
Fihj; (4)
E

ihj ()j  > ihj

=
i   1
ai   i + 1
Fihj: (5)
The mass of industry-i, country-h rms that select into market j is given by Nihj = 
kih=

ihj
ai Mih. Country-h exports to country j can be expressed asXihj = NihjE rihj ()j  > ihj.
The industrys aggregate sales are Rih =
P
j Xihj. Industry employment can be easily
14We thank Ralf Ossa for helpful comments and suggestions on this part of the model.
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shown to be Lih = [(i   1) =i]Rih.15 The price level Pij is given by
Pij =
24 ai
ai   i + 1
X
h
Nihj
 
i
i   1
 ihj
ihj
!1 i35 11 i : (6)
Melitz (2003) denes industry productivity as
~ih =
"X
j
NihjP
j Nihj
 
~ihj
i 1# 1i 1 ; (7)
where
~ihj =
1
1 Gih
 
ihj
 Z 1
ihj
i 1gih () =

ai
ai   i + 1
 1
i 1
ihj: (8)
G () denotes the distribution function of .
Dene x^  x0=x as a gross growth rate, where x and x0 denote, respectively, the values
of a variable before and after the trade liberalization:
X^ihj = N^ihj =
 
^ihj
 ai ; (9)
R^ih = L^ih =
X
j
XihjP
j Xihj
X^ihj; (10)
P^ij =
"X
h
XihjP
hXihj
N^ihj (^ ihj)
1 i  ^ihji 1
# 1
1 i
: (11)
Substituting out terms in the price index equation leads to
P^ij =
"X
h
XihjP
hXihj
^
 ai
ihj
# 1=ai
: (12)
We can use the system (12) to solve for the growth rates of the price levels P^ij as a
function of the changes in transport costs ^ ihj. From equation (3), we can solve for ^

ihj
as a function of P^ij and ^ ihj,
^ihj = ^ ihj=P^ij; (13)
15Implicit here is the assumption that the labor necessary to provide the xed costs Fihj is not part
of the manufacturing industrys employment. We think of the xed cost as services being provided by
some other sector that operates under perfectly competitive conditions. As discussed, examples include
conducting market studies or setting up distribution networks in foreign markets.
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and thereafter generate predictions for the industry aggregates of interest.
In this model, a decrease in country js own import tari¤s triggers an increase in
imports and a reduction in country js price level, thereby reducing the revenues (and
prots) obtained by country js rms in their domestic market. This crowds out some
low-productivity rms, thus raising average industry productivity, (7). A reduction in
the trade barriers that country js rms face in their export markets has an ambiguous
e¤ect on (7). On the one hand, rms that were not exporting previously (thus with
productivity lower than that of old exporters) become exporters. This reduces the average
productivity of country js exporters. On the other hand, the relative mass of exporters
over non-exporters rises; since the former are on average more productive than the latter,
this e¤ect contributes positively to industry productivity.
Notice that this model minimizes the number of channels for the transmission of
changes in trade barriers to changes in industry productivity. In comparison with Melitz
(2003), for example, the no-free-entry assumption shuts down the possibility of any e¤ects
via changes in Mij. The quasi-linear preferences eliminate general-equilibrium e¤ects via
changes in the relative demands of manufacturing goods; and the assumption that the
homogeneous good is produced by all countries in equilibrium shuts down any e¤ects via
the labour market, as it leads to wj = 1 for all j. (We allow for these additional channels
below.)
Finally, we note that expression (7) measures theoretical productivity, which is con-
ceptually di¤erent from the measured productivity we observe in the data and on which
our descriptive statistics and empirical moments from Section 2 are based. As we will see
next, however, theoretical and measured productivity growth are very similar in prac-
tice, so that the intuition just provided will continue to hold once we move to measured
productivity and trade ows.
Construction of Theoretical Moments
We now construct theoretical counterparts of our empirical moments (mean, variances
and covariance of industry-level real growth rates of trade ows and productivity). We
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try to stay as close as possible to the procedures used by Statistics Canada to assure
comparability between theoretical and empirical moments.
We compute real growth rates of measured labour productivity growth by deating
value added per worker with a suitable producer price index (PPI). In our baseline model,
value added growth equals revenue growth because there are no intermediate inputs.
Thus, measured productivity growth is equal to:
MPGih =
\Rih=Lih
[PPI ih
=

[PPI ih
 1
: (14)
Note that in this basic productivity measure, any measured productivity growth will
come from changes in the PPI, as the variations in revenue and employment exactly
o¤set each other. In our robustness checks below, we will also look at additional sources
of (measured) productivity gains.
Similarly, real growth in bilateral trade ows between countries h and j is dened as:
MTGihj =
X^ihj
[PPI ih
Xihj
Xihj +Xijh
+
X^ijh
[PPI ij
Xijh
Xihj +Xijh
: (15)
Note that we follow Statistics Canadas approach to use PPIs to deate export sales.16
Both growth rates require a suitable PPI deator. In Appendix A, we provide a more
detailed description of how Statistics Canada calculated PPIs at the sectorial level during
our sample period, and how their procedure can be replicated in our model. In essence,
Statistics Canadas relevant PPIs were based on sample surveys of currently active rms
and gave more weight to larger producers. They also used so-called factory gate prices
which exclude any costs associated with transport, distribution, subsidies, taxes or tari¤s.
We compute a theoretical PPI which captures these features while preserving a tight link
to theoretical productivity. Specically, we use the factory-gate price charged by the rm
16See Statistics Canada (2001). For a few sectors, export price indices were used but for the vast
majority of sectors in our data, Statistics Canada relied on PPIs during our sample period. Also note
that exports in our data are valued at free-on-board prices which exclude charges for shipping services
incurred abroad, but might include other parts of the overall trade costs such as information or regulatory
compliance costs. Here, we use the value of trade ows inclusive of trade costs, although we will also
present results excluding them in our robustness checks.
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with average productivity, p (~ih) = [(i   1) =i]wh=~ih,17 where
~ih =
"X
j
NihjP
j Nihj
 
~ihj
i 1# 1i 1 (16)
and
~ihj =
1
1 Gih
 
ihj
Z 1
ihj
i 1gih () d =

ai
ai   i + 1
 1
i 1
ihj: (17)
As noted by Melitz (2003), ~ihj can be interpreted as a weighted average of rm pro-
ductivities, where the weights reect the relative output shares of rms. Also note that
~ihj is calculated as an average across active rms, reecting the sampling procedure of
Statistics Canada explained in Appendix A. We thus obtain our theoretical PPI as:
[PPI ih = p^ (~ih) =
p0 (~0ih)
p (~ih)
=

~0ih
~ih
 1
; (18)
where the growth rate ~0ih=~ih can be written as
~0ih
~ih
=
8<:
"X
j
 
N 0ihj
Nihj
NihjP
j0 Nihj0
!# 1X
j
"
N 0ihj
Nihj

~0ihj
~ihj
i 1 Nihj  ~ihji 1P
j0 Nihj0
 
~ihj0
i 1
#9=;
1
i 1
:
(19)
Expression (19) requires the number of exporters from country h to country j in sector i,
which we do not observe in our data. We show in Appendix A that bilateral sector specic
exports (Xihj) can be used as a proxy for Nihj under the additional assumption that the
xed market entry costs (Fihj) are proportional to some observable destination-specic
factor that is exogenous to our model.18
From (14), (15) and (19), we computeMPGih andMTGihj separately for each of the
203 sectors in our data as a function of changes in tari¤s (^ ihj), initial trade ows (Xihj)
and the remaining parameters i =

ai; i
	
. We then calculate our theoretical moments
as means, variances and covariances across sectors.19
17We are grateful to Marc Melitz for pointing this out. See Ghironi and Melitz (2005) for a related
discussion.
18We use sector-destination absorption (mij) in the calibration of our baseline model, although in
practice almost identical results are obtained if we use destination market population size or GDP.
19For example, mean trade growth is calculated as m1;model () = 1I
XI
i=1
MTGihj
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Regarding the choice of i, we pursue two alternative approaches. We rst use sector-
specic estimates of i derived from data not used in the calibration of our model. For
our baseline model, we derive estimates for i from the ratio of revenues to operating
prots using rm-level data from Compustat North America. Estimates for ai are ob-
tained in two steps. First, we estimate the Pareto shape parameter of the industry sales
distribution (air) using industry-specic concentration ratios. We then use the fact that
in our model ai = a
i
r  (i   1) to obtain estimates for ai. For more details on these
estimation procedures, see Appendix B.
Our second approach is to choose i so as to match our empirical moments via GMM
estimation. In order for this exercise to be meaningful, we restrict parameters to be equal
across sectors (i = ). Given that our benchmark model has two remaining parameters
and we have ve empirical moments, this overidenties the model and allows us to test
the validity of our moment restrictions. Formally, the GMM estimator of  is given by
^gmm = arg min

g () = arg min


m ()0Wnm ()
	
; (20)
where m () = [m1 () :::mK ()]0 and mk () = mk;data   mk;model () are the individual
moments. Wn is a (positive denite) weighting matrix to be estimated in a rst step. We
compute a rst step estimate ^0 by setting Wn = W 0n = I. We then use ^0 to compute
the optimal weighting matrix
W optn =

1
I
1
I   1
XI
i=1
mn

^0

m0n

^0
 1
(21)
and obtain ^gmm by setting Wn = W optn in (20). The best way to understand our GMM
estimation approach is as a test of the models basic ability to match the empirical
moments of interest. As we will see, all but one of our models will fail even this most
basic test.
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3 Evaluation of Baseline Model
We now evaluate our baseline models quantitative predictions and show that the model
is inherently incapable of matching our empirical moments.
Data
Our baseline analysis uses sectorial-level data on trade ows, production, labour produc-
tivity per worker and tari¤s for 203 Canadian manufacturing sectors for the period 1988
to 1996. In our robustness checks, we will also use data for the pre-liberalisation period
(1980 to 1988). Note that production data is needed to calculate internal trade ows as
the value of production minus exports (see Wei, 1996).
All Canadian data are from Statistics Canada as prepared by Treer (2004).20 We also
require comparable data for the United States and a third country (Rest of the World,
or RoW). We dene RoW here as Japan, the United Kingdom and (West) Germany,
Canadas three largest trading partners after the United States in 1988.21 Data for the
United States and RoW are from Treer (2004), the U.S. Census Bureau (see Schott,
2010) and UNIDOs Industrial Statistics Database.
We convert all data to the 4-digit level of the Canadian Standard Industrial Classica-
tion of 1980. Value data are expressed in 1992 Canadian dollars using the US-Canadian
Dollar exchange rate and 4-digit industry price and value added deators. To ensure
compatibility with our choice of numéraire, we further normalize all value data by Cana-
dian industry-level wages, proxied by total annual earnings per worker. Data on exchange
rates, deators and wages are also from Treer (2004).
20These data are available from Daniel Treers homepage at http://www-
2.rotman.utoronto.ca/~dtreer/les/Data.htm.
21Together with the United States, these three countries accounted for approximately 85% of Canadian
exports and imports in 1988, the year before the implementation of CUSFTA (and for more later on).
Note that having a third country in the empirical estimation is important to capture possible trade
diversion e¤ects. Adding more countries, however, would not add new insights and would complicate the
computational aspects of our estimation.
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Baseline Results
Table 2 reports results for the theoretical moments computed for our baseline model.
For comparison, the rst row restates the empirical moments from Table 1 which we are
trying to match.
In row (2), we present the models predictions when we use estimates for ai and i
estimated on external data sources. We report the mean and standard deviation of these
parameter estimates further down in the table (panel Parameters, Data (mean, sd)).
Our parameter estimates for i are comparable to other estimates in the literature. For
example, Broda and Weinstein (2006) estimate an average of  = 4:0 across 256 SITC-3
goods between 1990 and 2001. Likewise, the mean across our estimates for the shape
parameter of industry sales distributions is ar = 2:1. Using Compustat data on the sales
of US listed rms, Chaney (2008) estimates ar = 2:0.
The models predictions are substantially out of line with what we observe in the
data, however. The model does not generate strong enough increases in either trade or
productivity, with the predictions for productivity being particularly far o¤. For example,
the model predicts a mean productivity increase over the period 1988-1996 of just 1:4%,
whereas the increase in the data is 30:4%. For comparison, we predict about a quarter
(30:9%) of the actual 118% average increase in trade ows.
In row (4), we choose parameters to minimize (weighted) deviations between theoreti-
cal and empirical moments, following the GMM approach outlined above.22 As expected,
the model does better in this case but there is still a substantial shortfall in the mean and
variance of productivity increases across sectors (we do better for trade ows now). Also
note that the optimization procedure pushes the parameter values up to a = 14:2 and
 = 8:5. The shape parameter (a) is precisely estimated, but the same is not true for
the estimated elasticity of substitution (). Finally, the last two rows of Table 2 report
22In row (3), we also report predictions based on our rst-step estimates (using the identity matrix
as our weighting matrix). These give equal weight to all moments and ignore the moment covariance
structure. As such, these predictions are more directly comparable to the ones presented in row (2) and
show to what extent the optimal choice of parameters improves upon predictions based on externally
estimated parameters. (Although we note that the externally estimated parameters vary by sector and
could, in principle, lead to more accurate predictions.)
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the value of the GMM objective function at its minimum (g

^gmm

).23 Given that our
baseline model is over-identied (ve moments and two parameters), we can also use
g

^gmm

as the basis for a test of overidentifying restrictions (see Greene, 2000). Under
the null that ^gmm = true, the GMM objective function follows a {2-distribution with
three degrees of freedom. The corresponding p-value (reported underneath the GMM
objective) indicates that we can reject this null hypothesis at the 1%-level.
What explains the inability of the model to simultaneously match trade and pro-
ductivity moments? A somewhat supercial answer is that the model simply does not
generate enough trade and productivity growth for the values of a and  estimated from
external data sources. But this does not explain why we cannot match our empirical
moments when we are allowed to freely choose these parameters in our GMM estimation.
Here, the underlying reasoning becomes more subtle and hinges on the models inability
to match relative trade and productivity growth.24 This is easiest to see for the case of a
symmetric trade liberalisation between two symmetric countries, although the following
intuition also carries through to the general asymmetric case used for our results in Table
2. The symmetry assumption implies that X^ihj = X^ijh = X^i, Xihj = Xijh = Xi, and
[PPI ih = [PPI ij = [PPI i, so that we obtain:
MTGihj
MPGih
=
X^i=[PPI i
[PPI i
 1 = X^i: (22)
Thus, the ratio of trade to productivity growth is simply the nominal growth rate of trade
ows. From (9), this is a power function of the change in the export productivity cuto¤
(^ihj) with the exponent equal to  ai. Given that we have ^ihj < 1 and estimates of ai of
on average 14:2 (see Table 2), this implies that the ratio of predicted trade to productivity
growth will be large. Indeed, from Table 2, the predicted mean increase in trade ows is
23Note that the GMM optimisation takes into account the full moment variance-covariance matrix
(W optn ). Thus, it contains more information than the simple comparison of moments in lines (1)-(3).
This also explains why the theoretical moments can all be smaller than the empirical moments at the
optimized parameter values.
24As we will see below, a similar reason explains why we cannot saveour baseline model by arguing
that our (external) estimates of a and  are biased, or that we cannot expect our simple model to match
all of the observed trade and productivity growth.
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22 times larger than the predicted mean increase in measured productivity when relying
on external parameter estimates for a and . By contrast, the corresponding ratio in
the data is only around four.
Furthermore, the predicted ratio is increasing in a. This is important for our GMM
estimation because it implies that a higher a will have two e¤ects. First, it leads to a
stronger decrease in the domestic price index for a given tari¤s reduction (see (12)) and
thus to a larger change in domestic and export cuto¤s (see (13)). This leads to higher
growth in measured productivity and trade ows. At the same time, however, a higher
a increases the ratio of trade to productivity growth exponentially. As a consequence,
if we increase a far enough to match measured productivity growth, we substantially
overestimate trade growth.25
Measured trade and productivity growth are of course also inuenced by , which
enters the PPI used to deate both measures. But in practice changes in  are quantita-
tively unimportant in the sense that they do not move the GMM objective function by
much.26 Figure 2 illustrates this point by plotting deviations of the rst empirical and
theoretical moments (mean productivity and trade growth) against a and .
Robustness Checks I: Measurement Issues and Outliers
Tables 3-6 show results for a rst set of robustness checks. In Table 3, we move back to
predictions based on externally estimated parameter values (which vary by sector). This
time, however, we change our sector-level estimates of i and air by factors which are
common across sectors. For example, lines 2-3 changes i to new;i = f  old;i where f
is the factor denoted in the rst column. The idea behind these changes is to investigate
whether systematic bias in our sector-level estimates of i and air could explain the models
poor performance.27 Note that because ai is calculated as a
i
 = a
i
r  (i   1), changing
25As we will see below, increases in a have an even larger impact on the relative variances of trade
and productivity growth, reinforcing the problem we have just described for means.
26This also explains why  is estimated with little precision, as can be seen from the high standard
error reported in Table 2.
27We need to impose a common factor across sectors for the variations in i and air. Otherwise, this
exercise would amount to trying to match ve moments with 2  203 parameters (one i and one air
per sector). Such a degree of underidentifcation would make a comparison between data and theoretical
predictions rather meaningless.
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i also leads to a corresponding variation in the shape parameter of the productivity
distribution, ai.
In lines 2-3 of Table 3, we change i by a factor of f = 1:5 and f = 2, respectively.
As expected from the discussion in the last subsection, increasing i and thus ai leads
to slightly higher productivity gains, but increases the mean and variance of trade ows
by much more. As a results, at new;i = 1:5 old;i, the model predicts about 60% of the
observed mean increase in trade ows, but already overpredicts the trade ow variance by
25%. At new;i = 2 old;i, we overpredict mean trade increases by around 15% and the
variance by a factor of 10, but still only obtain a predicted mean increase in productivity
of 1:7% and a variance of 0:0002 (or 1=500th of the actual variance). In line 4, we go one
step further and choose f in new;i = f  old;i to exactly match the mean growth rate of
trade ows. Again, this leads to a substantial overprediction in terms of the variance of
trade growth rates, but does not generate nearly enough productivity growth.
Lines 5-7 repeat the same exercise with changes in air, which in turn lead to changes
in ai = a
i
r  (i   1). The results are again similar.28 Increasing air helps to match the
mean trade ow increases, but cannot generate enough productivity increases. This is
of course just a reconrmation of the intuition we gave in the last section. Our baseline
model does not get the relative impact of tari¤ changes on trade and productivity growth
right. Thus, changing parameter values to match the average level of one of these growth
rates is of no help in matching moments based on the other growth rate.29 ;30
We next examine the sensitivity of our results to outliers, by dropping all sectors which
fall within the top or bottom 5% of either the trade or productivity growth distributions.
This drops 42 sectors, leaving us with 161 observations. Panel A of Table 4 show how
28Note that changing  and ar by the same factor f increases a by more in the case of varying .
Varying  also has an independent impact on measured trade and productivity growth. As discussed in
the last section, however, this impact is quantitatively less important, explaining the relatively similar
results in lines 2-4 and 5-7.
29Simultaneously varying ar and  by di¤erent factors is also possible, but would lead to similar results
as our baseline GMM estimates in Table 2.
30The same point can also be made in a slightly di¤erent way. In unreported results, we show that
one can also choose ar or  to exactly match trade growth rates, sector by sector. One can then
look at predicted growth rates of productivity and compare them to the data, again sector by sector.
While this approach ignores higher moments (variances and covariances) and does not allow for formal
overidentication tests in a GMM framework, the predictive failure of the model is again quite evident:
predicted productivity growth rates are too low by an order of magnitude.
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this changes the empirical and theoretical moments. (Note that we now only compute
theoretical moments based on 161 sectors.) Dropping outliers reduces mean increases
in trade ows and productivity and, in particular, the variance of trade ow increases.
Still, the model is only able to match a fraction of the variation observed in the data,
and does again particularly poorly with regards to productivity. In Panel B, we only
drop the 5% of sectors with the highest trade or productivity growth (21 sectors, leaving
182 observations). This does of course work in favour of the model, but its predictive
performance remains poor.
In the next robustness check, we modify the computation of our theoretical moments
in a way that leads to larger productivity gains. So far, we have valued rm revenue at
destination-specic rather than factory gate prices. We now follow Statistics Canadas
procedures yet more closely and compute both revenue and trade growth at factory-gate
prices, i.e., excluding trade costs. This leads to the following expressions for measured
trade and productivity growth:
MPGFGih =
R^mih=L^ih
[PPI ih
=

[PPI ih
 1 X
j
Xihj= ihjP
j Xihj= ihj
X^ihj
^ ihj
! X
j
XihjP
j Xihj
X^ihj
! 1
;
(23)
MTGFGihj =
X^mihj
[PPI ih
Xmihj
Xmihj +X
m
ijh
+
X^mijh
[PPI ij
Xmijh
Xmihj +X
m
ijh
; (24)
where R^mih denotes measured revenue growth which is now di¤erent from R^ih as it is
valued at factory gate prices. Likewise, we have X^mihj = X^ihj=^ ihj and X
m
ijh = Xihj= ihj.
Note that any reduction in tari¤s will now automatically lead to an increase in measured
revenue and trade growth in the data.
Table 5 presents results for this alternative measurement approach. Compared to
Table 2, the di¤erences are only minor. As expected, we achieve higher productivity
growth. But we are still an order of magnitude below the actually observed growth rates.
In addition, the new approach also leads to higher trade ow increases which makes it
more di¢ cult to simultaneously match both trade and productivity moment. This is
evident from the results for the internally optimised parameter values, where we obtain
a GMM objective function value very close to the baseline results.
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Our nal robustness check in this section uses a di¤erent modelling of tari¤s. So
far, we have followed the approach in most of the literature of treating tari¤s as being
isomorphic to physical transportation costs in our formulation of overall trade costs (see
Section 3.1). We now explicitly model tari¤s as a payment deducted from the rms
revenue. This brings about a number of changes to the equilibrium conditions of our
model. We briey outline the most important ones here and refer the reader to Appendix
C for a full exposition of the modied model.
Most importantly, the rms market-specic prot function can now be written as:
ihj =
pihj
1 + tihj
qihj (pihj)   ihjqihj (pihj) 1

  fihj; (25)
where pihj denotes the price paid by the consumers of the importing country. This mod-
ication leads to the following equilibrium conditions for price indices and productivity
cut-o¤s (expressed in changes):
P^ij =
"X
h
TihjXihjP
h TihjXihj

T^ihj
1  i
i 1a
i

# 1=ai
; (26)
^ihj =

T^ihj
 i
i 1
P^ij
; (27)
where Tihj  1+tihj. Similar to before, we can use (26) to solve for price index changes as
a function of tari¤ changes. Using (27) we can then solve for changes in the productivity
cut-o¤s. These are su¢ cient to calculate changes in trade ows and industry revenues:
X^ihj = N^ihj =
 
^ihj
 ai ; (28)
R^ih = ^ih = L^ih =
X
j
XihjP
j Xihj
X^ihj: (29)
Note that for the purpose of our estimation, the key change is that the parameter i
now enters the price index and productivity cut-o¤ equilibrium conditions. Given that
we noted before that the impact of variations in i on the theoretical moments was
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quantitatively unimportant in our baseline model, this modication should, in principle,
allow the model to match the data better. This is because i now directly enters the
productivity cut-o¤s (and thus nominal trade ow increases), rather than only entering
measured trade and productivity growth through the theoretical PPI.
In practice, however, this additional impact channel only leads to minor improvements
in the models predictive performance, as is evident from Table 6. The reason for this is
that ai and 1=i tend to move our moments in the same directions. Thus, the increased
impact i now has is not useful in matching the data. Figure 3 illustrates this by plotting
deviations of theoretical from empirical moments against ai and i, as Figure 2 did for
our baseline model. We note that the tendency to move theoretical moments in similar
ways also explains the reduction in the precision with which the parameter ai is now
estimated (although i is now of course estimated with a lower standard error).31
Robustness Checks II: Is Our Baseline Model Too Stylized?
We now return to the issue of whether our baseline model abstracts from too many real-
world features to make a comparison with the data informative. We argued in Section
2 that several aspects of CUSFTA made it a reasonable abstraction to rely on models
with relatively simple, tari¤-reduction-driven data generating processes. Nevertheless,
an important concern is that the observed post-1988 changes in trade and productivity
are simply too large to be explained by tari¤ reductions alone, and that other factors
must have been present in the process generating the observed data. Since such factors
are absent from our model, one might not be surprised that the model falls short of
generating su¢ cient trade and productivity responses. We try to address this concern in
several ways in this subsection.
We start by progressively removing sources of variation from the data which are
arguably absent from the model. First, we take rst di¤erences in growth rates between
the post- and pre-liberalisation period (1980-1988 and 1988-1996, respectively). The
31In an additional robustness check (not reported), we also constructed a PPI deator by giving equal
weight to all active rms, rather than overweighting larger rms (see Appendix A for details). This
yielded very similar results to the one in Table 2, with a GMM objective function value of 91.9835
compared to 91.7885 for the baseline model.
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purpose of this exercise is to eliminate time-invariant factors from the data which are
absent from our model, such as technological progress leading to ongoing productivity
growth. Indeed, rst-di¤erenced growth rates are less than half as large on average as
growth rates in levels (see Table 7, rst line). To assure comparability with these cleaned
data and our theoretical predictions, we perform a similar procedure when generating
data from our model. That is, we separately calculate predictions for the pre- and the
post-liberalization period in the same way described above for our baseline model. For
the 1980-1988 period, we use initial trade ows for 1980 and observed tari¤ cuts between
1980 and 1988. (The remaining parameters, a and , are assumed to remain constant
over the entire period 1980-1996.) We then rst-di¤erence the generated data across the
two periods in the same way we di¤erenced the actual data.32
Secondly, we implement a di¤erence-in-di¤erences strategy similar to Treer (2004).
We regress rst di¤erences of trade and productivity growth (as calculated above) on rst
di¤erences in tari¤ cuts, and compute predicted values from these two regressions. We
then use the model to generate data for both the pre- and post-liberalization period (as
described above) and run the same regressions on the generated data. We again compute
predicted values and compare them to the predicted values from the regressions using the
actual data. The purpose of this approach is to only use variation which is correlated with
tari¤ cuts. Since this is the driving force in the models data generating process, we would
expect the model to perform much better when focusing on this source of variation only.
The rst line of Table 8 shows that this approach does indeed lead to further substantial
reductions in empirical mean growth rates, especially for productivity.
Table 7 presents the full results for rst di¤erences, Table 8 for the di¤erence-in-
di¤erences approach. As discussed, rst-di¤erencing the data reduces the magnitude of
all moments with the exception of the variance of (rst-di¤erenced) productivity growth
rates. However, the rst-di¤erenced theoretical moments are also smaller, so that we only
32An alternative approach would be to directly compare the 1988-1996 model predictions to the rst-
di¤erenced data. This is not strictly correct, however, because there were small (GATT-driven) tari¤
reductions in the 1980-1988 period, too. These generate positive, if small, growth in trade and pro-
ductivity in our model, which in turn lead to di¤erences between rst-di¤erenced and 1988-1996 model
growth rates. In practice, however, results are very similar for this alternative approach (available from
the authors).
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obtain a small reduction in the percentage di¤erence with the rst two empirical moments
(mean growth rates). The reduction in the covariance di¤erence is more substantial, but
di¤erences in variances actually go up slightly. Thus, the models overall performance is
similar to our baseline results. This is true when we use externally estimated data (row
2) and when we choose parameters to match the empirical moments (rows 3-4). This lack
of improvement is also reected in the GMM objective function value which is basically
unchanged compared to the baseline results in Table 2.
The di¤erence-in-di¤erences approach fares better. We now get much closer to ob-
served trade ow changes even when using externally estimated parameters (we match
75% of the mean increase and 50% of the variance). We also do better for mean pro-
ductivity increases (we match 30% of the observed increase). However, we are still an
order of magnitude below the actual variance of productivity increases and the covariance
between trade and productivity increases. The better ability of the model to match the
cleaneddata is also reected in a lower GMM objective function value, although we still
reject the null that the moment restrictions implied by our model are valid at the 1%
level.
A remaining concern is that tari¤ reductions might be correlated with other factors
present in the data, but absent from our model. As discussed in Section 2, there are
a priori few reasons to believe that such omitted variables were important during the
implementation of CUSFTA. We also have econometric evidence from Treer (2004) that
endogeneity issues related to tari¤ reductions are unlikely to be a major problem in our
data (see Section 2). Nevertheless, we explore possible implications for our results in
the following. A natural candidate for an omitted variable are changes in other trade
costs which we assumed to be constant in our baseline simulation. These changes could
be due to reductions in non-tari¤ barriers (including more e¢ cient border procedures),
reductions in physical transport costs over the sample period, or even a reduction in
the uncertainty regarding possible future tari¤ hikes.33 If such variables were indeed
important, using only the variation in the data associated with tari¤ cuts is still not a
33See footnote 10 for details.
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faircomparison because part of this variation will still be driven by factors not present
in the model.
It is easy to show, however, that allowing for such correlations is not su¢ cient to
rescue our model. In Section 3, we dened trade costs as consisting of a tari¤ (thj) and a
component comprising all other trade costs (chj), such that hj = (1 + chj) (1 + thj). We
do not observe changes in (1 + chj) but can make a number of assumptions which should,
in principle, help the model to generate larger trade and productivity gains. Our rst
approach is to work with sectorial-level estimates of a and  as before and assume that
the change in (1 + cCAN;US) and (1 + cUS;CAN) is proportional to observed reductions
of US and Canadian import tari¤s, respectively. That is, for h; j 2 fCAN;USg, we
assume that
 
1 + c
0
hj

= (1 + chj) = c
 
1 + t
0
hj

= (1 + thj). The change in hj will thus be
^hj = c
 
1 + t
0
hj

= (1 + thj)
2
.34 The second approach uses our GMM framework but
allows for a third parameter in addition to a and  mean changes in (1 + chj). That
is, c =
 
1 + c
0
hj

= (1 + chj) and ^hj = c
 
1 + t
0
hj

= (1 + thj). We now try to minimize our
GMM objective function through varying a,  and c. Note that the rst approach, in
particular, is similar in spirit to our previous robustness check of varying  and ar by
factors which are common across sectors.35
Table 9 presents the results for both robustness checks. In lines 2-4, we show the-
oretical moments for di¤erent values of c. Lines 2 and 3 use values of c which lead to
theoretical predictions of mean trade growth rates which are too low and too high, re-
spectively. As expected, decreases in c (i.e., stronger reductions in other trade costs) lead
to higher trade and productivity growth. Line 4 uses c = 0:98 which allows us to exactly
match mean trade growth. At this value, however, we overestimate the variance of trade
growth by a factor of ve, but still only achieve less than one eight of the observed mean
productivity growth, and only one hundredth of the variance of productivity growth. Line
34We assume that trade costs other than tari¤s for exports and imports to and from the rest of the world
remain unchanged. Allowing for less than perfect correlation between chj and thj is also possible but
does not change the following results qualitatively. Note that if chj and thj are completely uncorrelated,
our previous approach of using tari¤-cut related variation will again be valid.
35Again, we restrict the variation in chj to be governed by one additional parameter only. As discussed
in footnote 27, allowing for more exibility would make our model underidentied and our approach much
less meaningful.
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5 shows moment deviations for our rst-step GMM estimates. While we now vary a, 
and c, we do not see major improvements as compared to our baseline GMM results in
Table 2.
The intuition for these negative results is similar in all cases. Allowing for changes in
non-tari¤ trade costs only allows the model to generate larger increases in both trade and
productivity; it does nothing to help address the models problem of getting the relative
growth rates right. This holds true even when we vary a,  and c simultaneously because
a and c have similar impacts on our theoretical moments and do not allow the model to
generate su¢ cient variation in trade and productivity growth.
The e¤ects are more subtle for the full GMM estimation. As before, the presence of
our weighting matrix W optn implies that the estimation now places much less weight on
the trade moments, and in particular on the deviation from the variance of trade growth
across sectors. This somewhat alleviates the problem that increases in c cannot generate
enough productivity growth because of the implied deviation from the trade growth
variance. As a result, we obtain much lower values for the GMM objective function than
in our baseline estimation. However, from a statistical point of view the model is still
rejected at the 1%-level. We also note that the parameter estimates are quite extreme.
We nd very low estimates for a and , and an implied reduction in non-tari¤ trade
costs (1 + chj) of more than 50%. This does not seem plausible given the absence of
major changes in transportation technology over the sample period and the rather minor
reductions in non-tari¤ barrier agreed to in CUSFTA.
One nal possibility is that there are factors present in the data, but absent from the
model, which lead to increases in productivity, but not trade growth, and happen to be
correlated with tari¤ reductions over the sample period. We cannot denitely exclude
this possibility because we do not see a way of cleaningour data of such factors that
is compatible with our theoretical framework.36 We note, however, that the solution we
will eventually propose relies on a related mechanism. As we show below, one way of
36Treer (2004) controls for productivity trends in the US and includes business cycle controls based on
aggregate movements in GDP and exchange rates. We did not adopt this approach because our model
predicts that such variables would themselves depend on CUSFTA-induced tari¤ reductions, making
them unsuitable as controls.
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matching model predictions and data is to allow for sources of within-rm productivity
growth which are triggered by tari¤ reductions.
4 Model Extensions
We now move on to a number of more major modications of our basic modelling frame-
work. The goal of this section is to explore which extensions are most promising in terms
of improving the baseline models predictive performance. As all the extensions we con-
sider are well known in the literature, we focus on an exposition of the most important
modications. We also outline how our main equilibrium conditions and our trade and
productivity measures change, and explain the economic intuition behind these changes.
A detailed exposition of the di¤erent models is available in the papers on-line appendix.37
Free Entry
The free-entry modelis identical to the baseline modelbut for the assumption of a
given mass of potential entrants, Mij. We now allow for rms to decide whether to enter
the market at the xed cost Fij (before they pick a draw of  from its distribution). This
adds a free-entry condition to the model which sets expected rm prots equal to the
xed entry cost Fij. As a consequence, we also obtain an additional set of equations when
we express the equilibrium conditions in changes:
1 =
X
j
XihjP
nXihn
^
 ai
ihj P^
ai
ij ; (30)
P^
 ai
ij =
X
h
XihjP
hXihj
M^ih^
 ai
ihj : (31)
The rst equation above is the free-entry condition in growth rates; the second equation
is the price index equation in growth rates. In comparison with (12), the growth in
the mass of rms M^ih is now an argument in the determination of price indices. These
equations can be solved for P^ij and M^ij, which in turn can then be used to generate the
37Available at: http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~hbrein/TheAppendix_20130717.pdf. Also see
Costinot and Rodriguez-Clare (2013) and Redding and Melitz (2013) for recent surveys of a number
of heterogeneous rm models.
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models predictions for all other variables of interest.
Adding free entry implies an additional e¤ect of trade liberalization on industry pro-
ductivity and trade ows, as the mass Mij reacts to changes in tari¤ barriers, with a
decrease if import barriers fall and an increase if export barriers fall. Other things equal,
an increase in Mij leads to higher average productivity as low-productivity entrants de-
cide not to produce. Similarly, an increase (decrease) in Mij increases (decreases) the
number of exporters and leads, ceteris paribus, to more (less) exports.
Thus, allowing for free entry has an a priori ambiguous e¤ect on trade ows, as well
as on theoretical and (through changes in the PPI) measured productivity. Whether
we observe an overall increase depends on whether the e¤ect of lower US import tari¤s
(which raises MCAN) outweighs the e¤ect of lower Canadian import tari¤s (which lowers
MCAN). This ambiguity is reected in the results in Table 10, where we actually observe a
slightly lower increase in average Canadian productivity when using externally estimated
parameter values (row 2). Thus, allowing for free entry does not help with improving
the models predictive performance with regards to productivity. We do predict slightly
higher trade ow increases, but remain far o¤ our target of 118%.38
The fact that allowing for free entry only marginally a¤ects model predictions also
explains that the free-entry model is not noticeably better than the baseline model at
matching our empirical moments when we can choose parameter values optimally (rows 3-
4). Indeed, the GMM objective function value is only slightly lower than the one reported
in Table 2 (83:30 compared to 91:79).
General Equilibrium
In our second model extension, we replace the quasi-linear utility function of the baseline
model with a Cobb-Douglas utility function
Uj =
Y
i2I
(Qij)
ij ; (32)
38Note that changes in trade ows are inuenced by changes in both MUS and MCanada Thus, trade
and productivity growth need not move in the same direction as compared to the baseline model.
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where ij > 0,
P
i ij = 1. We also assume free entry and remove the numéraire sector.
39
In analytical terms, the most important changes implied by this model are (i) the
presence of wages both as unknowns and as a relevant variable in many of the equations
that pin down industry outcomes; (ii) the presence of labour market clearing within the
equilibrium conditions. For the sake of brevity, we omit a detailed description of the
equilibrium conditions in growths rates here. In the On-line Appendix we show that we
can obtain predictions for all growth rates of interest by manipulating the growth rates
of the price index, the free-entry condition and the labour market clearing condition.40
In this general equilibrium version of our model, the e¤ects of trade liberalization now
also operate via changes in the demand for labour and its subsequent e¤ect on wages.
A lowering of US import tari¤s leads to a higher demand for Canadian exports, which
in turn raises Canadian labour demand and (with a xed labour supply) wages. Ceteris
paribus, this increases production costs, dampening the overall increase in Canadian
exports but also driving some of the less productive Canadian rms out of the market.
A reduction in Canadian import tari¤s has the opposite e¤ect through a reduction in
domestic demand for Canadian producers. Compared to the baseline model, this lowers
wages and production costs, dampening the productivity increasing e¤ect of tougher
import competition from the US.
Note that these wage e¤ects operate in addition to the free-entry e¤ects described in
the last subsection, but also modify them. For example, a reduction in Canadian wages
in response to lower Canadian import tari¤s will also dampen the decline in the number
of potential entrants (Mij). Thus, Canadian exports will decline by less compared to a
39Allowing for free entry and Cobb-Douglas preferences while keeping the numéraire sector (that is,
xing all wages to 1) yields results identical to those of our free-entry model. This is due to the
fact that, besides labor income being the same across the two models, the free-entry conditions in both
models lead to the same price levels.
40Ossa (2014) points out that the choice of numéraire matters in the presence of aggregate trade
imbalances. This is not an issue for our models with quasi-linear preferences because aggregate trade
decits are absorbed by our homogeneous nal goodA; but it is relevant for the present general equilbrium
extension. Ossa suggests adjusting the raw data to eliminate trade imbalances. Unfortunately, it is
unclear how to extend his procedure to labor productivity, our second key data input. It also seems
likely that cleaning our trade data as suggested by Ossa would not change our results qualitatively.
This is because our empirical moment, total trade growth (export plus imports), would basically remain
unchanged. Trade ows also inuence model predictions through initial trade shares, but they do not
have a quantitatively important inuence on the relative growth rate of trade and productivity (see the
discussion on pp. 14-15).
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situation without a wage response, and productivity will drop by less.
A priori, the expected change in our model predictions is thus again ambiguous com-
pared to both the baseline and the free-entry version of our model. Table 11 shows that
trade and productivity growth are indeed very similar to the free-entry version when we
use externally estimated parameter values (row 2). The same is true when we choose
parameter values to match our empirical moments. Our key statistic, the GMM objective
function value is practically identical to the one for the free-entry version. We conclude
that allowing for general equilibrium wage e¤ects is quantitatively unimportant in match-
ing the data.
Intermediate Inputs
In the third extension of our model, we assume that the production of manufacturing
varieties requires both labour and intermediate inputs:
qij () = 
"
Qinputij ()
i
#i 
lij ()
1  i
1 i
; (33)
where Qinputij denotes the amount of the aggregate manufacturing good used as an inter-
mediate input, and i 2 [0; 1).41
In this case, the price and expenditure equations in changes can be rewritten as
P^
ai
i 1
ij =

E^ij
i ai 1
(1 i)2
"X
h
XihjP
mXimj
^
 ai
ihj
1
P^
iai
ih
# 1
1 i
; (34)
E^ij =
1
Eij
"
mij + PijQ
input
ij P^
 aii
ij
 X
h
XijhP
hXijh
^
 ai
ijh P^
ai
ih E^
ai
i 1
ih
!#
: (35)
This yields a system of non-linear equations in P^ij and E^ij. Once we solve for P^ij and E^ij,
we can solve for the growth rates of the variables of interest. The expression for expendi-
ture is more elaborate now because it now also encompasses purchases of intermediates
(i.e., Eij = mij + PijQ
input
ij ).
41For simplicity, we abstract from interindustry input-output linkages (see Caliendo and Parro, 2012,
for such an extension). Note that in order to isolate the e¤ect of allowing for intermediates, we have also
switched back to the no free-entry, no general equilibrium case.
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Labour productivity is now value added per worker,
V Aij
Lij
=
Rij   PijQvij
Lij
; (36)
and its measured growth rate is
MPGintih =
\V Aih=Lih
[PPI ih
=

P^ij
 i
(~0ih=~ih) : (37)
A comparison with expressions (14) and (18) reveals that allowing for intermediate in-
puts adds

P^ij
 i
as an additional source of measured productivity growth. Intuitively,
the availability of cheaper (imported) intermediate inputs leads to a stronger decrease in
the domestic PPI for a given change in the productivity of the averagerm (~0ih=~ih),
and thus to stronger increases in measured productivity. Note, however, that increases
in ~0ih=~ih will tend to be lower than in the baseline model. This is because lower input
costs mean that some of the less productive rms can stay in the market, ceteris paribus.
Table 12 shows that the overall impact on productivity is positive. When we use ex-
ternally estimated parameter values (row 2), we more than double predicted productivity
growth as compared to the baseline model. However, a large gap between predicted and
actual productivity gains remains (2:95% vs. 30:41%). The results also reveal that allow-
ing for intermediates increases predicted trade ows as intermediates make up a growing
proportion of international trade. Thus, while the presence of intermediate inputs allows
us to obtain larger productivity increases, it also leads to stronger trade growth. This
again makes it di¢ cult for the model to simultaneously match trade and productivity
growth and explains why our GMM approach is still unsuccessful in matching the empir-
ical moments (rows 3 and 4). While the GMM objective function is 50% lower than in
the baseline model, the overidentication test still rejects at the 1%-level.42
42Note that the model with intermediates has one additional parameter (), so that we lose one degree
of freedom as compared to the baseline model. This is taken into account in the reported p-value which
in any case is substantially below the 1% level.
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Multi-product Firms
The nal extension we consider is to introduce multi-product rm features as modelled
in Bernard et al. (2011) into the baseline model.43 As in Bernard et al. (2011), we
introduce an additional layer into our utility function by modelling nal goods (Qi) as a
continuum of products which are imperfect substitutes in demand. Within each product,
rms supply horizontally di¤erentiated varieties. While rms produce one variety of each
product, they can supply a range of products. In addition to productivity (), rms now
also draw product attributes() for the continuum of products which act as demand
shifters. We assume that  is Pareto distributed with location parameter k and shape
parameter a. Firms observe their  and  and decide whether to pay the additional xed
costs associated with entering di¤erent markets and products. As we explain in the On-
line Appendix, the derivation of our equilibrium conditions and productivity measures
is similar to the baseline model. The main di¤erence is that they now contain a third
parameter (a) which governs productivity and trade growth rates in addition to a and
.44
Intuitively, the multi-product modelreinforces the between-rm reallocation e¤ect
on productivity with a within-rm reallocation e¤ect as a response to trade liberalization.
Firms reallocate resources from product-varieties with (now loss-making) low attributes
to product-varieties with (more protable) high attributes, thus leading to higher rm-
level productivity. As we show in the On-line Appendix, this leads to a stronger decrease
in the industry PPI and thus a more pronounced increase in industry productivity. At
the same time, the additional within-rm productivity e¤ect also reduces the increase in
imports as domestic rms become more productive relative to foreign exporters.
As seen in Table 13, this combination of e¤ects makes the multi-product rm model
quite successful in matching the observed data. We are now able to simultaneously match
productivity and trade ow increases by choosing the appropriate model parameters.45
43Apart from the multi-product rm features described below, we thus switch back to the assumptions
of the benchmark model. That is, we assume a given massMij , impose i = 0 for all sectors, and assume
quasilinear preferences and the presence of a numéraire good.
44 governs the substitutability of product varieties and is the equivalent of  in our baseline model
in terms of its role in the estimation procedure.
45Note that we do not have estimates for our parameters obtained from external sources. This would
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Indeed, our overidentication test is now unable to reject the model at conventional
levels of statistical signicance.46 We see this as an indication that sources of within-
rm productivity increases need to be added to our baseline model in order to solve the
problem of simultaneously matching trade and productivity growth rates in the wake of
CUSFTA. While we have used the multi-product rm model of Bernard et al. (2011)
to achieve these within-rm productivity gains, our conjecture is that other modelling
frameworks will yield similar results. For example, within-rm productivity gains could
also be achieved through technological upgrading in response to trade liberalization (see
Bustos (2011)). As we noted in the introduction to this paper, the presence of within-
rm productivity e¤ects has indeed been documented for CUSFTA by Treer (2004) and
Lileeva and Treer (2011). But there is evidence that such e¤ects were important in
other trade liberalization episodes as well, including Argentina (see Bustos, 2011) and
India (see Topalova and Khandelwal, 2011).
One concern with the multi-product extension is that we have now one more parameter
at our disposition. This will make it easier to match our empirical moments within a
given sample, but might not necessarily lead to the best out-of-sample predictions (this
is the classic overttingproblem).
In order to evaluate whether this is an issue in the present context, we also perform
the following out-of-sample test of our baseline model and the four extensions discussed
above. We rst estimate the model parameters on the pre-liberalisation period (1980-
1988). We then use these estimates to obtain trade and productivity growth predictions
for the post-liberalization period (1988-1996) and recompute the GMM objective function
with these new predictions.47 If overtting were a problem, we would expect a higher
value for the multi-product rm model than for the other extensions. Table 14 shows
that this is not the case the multi-product rm model continues to outperform all other
extensions.
require rm-level data similar to the data available to Bernard et al. (2011). Unfortunately, we do not
have access to such data for Canada or the US.
46Note that the p-value in Table 13 has been adjusted to account for the loss of one degree of freedom
due to the fact that now have three parameters.
47To ensure comparability, we use the same weighting matrix as in the original (post-liberalization)
GMM estimation.
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5 Conclusions
In this paper, we examined the quantitative predictions of heterogeneous rm models à
la Melitz (2003) in the context of the Canada - US Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA) of
1989. We computed predicted increases in trade ows and measured productivity across
a range of standard models and compared them to the post-CUSFTA increases observed
in the data.
Starting from a version of Chaney (2008), we found that this model was not able
to simultaneously match both trade and productivity increases. This was true when we
used sectorial parameter estimates obtained from other data sources, or when we chose
parameters to minimize deviations between theoretical and empirical moments via a
simple GMM procedure. Our basic result were also robust to di¤erent ways of computing
predicted productivity and trade growth, and to comparing model predictions and data
in ways which eliminate a number of unmodelled determinants of trade and productivity
increases. In each case, the fundamental problem remained that predicted increases in
trade ows for a given change in tari¤s were much too large relative to the predicted
increase in measured productivity.
We also considered di¤erent extensions of our basic framework by allowing for free
entry, tradable intermediate inputs, general equilibrium e¤ects operating through wages,
and endogenous rm-level productivity through adjustments in product scope as in
Bernard et al. (2011). Free entry and general equilibrium e¤ects did not markedly
improve the models performance. Introducing tradable intermediates helped somewhat,
but formal over-identication tests in our GMM framework still rejected this model vari-
ant. The only model that is capable of providing a good t to the data and of passing
our over-identication tests was the multi-product rm extension. We interpret these
results as evidence for the need to explicitly model within-rm productivity increases
when constructing quantitative trade models capable of explaining rst-order features of
trade liberalization episodes.
Holger Breinlich, University of Essex, CEP and CEPR
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Appendix
A PPI Deators
In the following, we describe how Statistics Canada calculated producer price indices
(PPIs) during our sample period, which are used to convert current to constant prices
entries in our data. We then outline how we apply that procedure to the computation of
theoretical moments in our setting.48
During our sample period (1980-1996), Statistics Canada computed current price en-
tries for 243 industries of which 211 industries are in the manufacturing sector. For
manufacturing, there was also a more disaggregated commodity level, the so-called Prin-
cipal Commodity Group Aggregation (PCGA), for which prices and shipment values
were available. There were 1057 PCGAs in total which served as the starting point for
constructing deators.
In a rst step, Statistics Canada computed PCGA price indices via the following sam-
pling procedure. Each month, Statistics Canada obtained price quotes from important
producers and from a random sample of smaller producers of a given PCGA manufac-
turing product. From these quotes, an average price was calculated.49 Price quotes
were always based on so-called factory gate prices which excluded any costs associated
with transport, distribution, subsidies, taxes or tari¤s. The particular weights used in
computing the average across price quotes varied from PCGA to PCGA, but generally
more weight was given to producers accounting for a larger fraction of industry output.
Yearly average prices were then computed as arithmetic averages over the 12 monthly
average prices. The sample of rms used for obtaining price quotes was updated every
December. That is, Statistics Canada drew a new sample of smaller producers from the
currently active rms. If any producer went out of business or dropped a product, Sta-
tistics Canada chose a still active producer/product as a replacement. By construction
48The following is based on Statistics Canada (1991; 1993; 2001; 2012a; 2012b).
49The exact number of price quotes obtained varied slightly over time. Currently, 3 to 15 price quotes
are obtained for each PCGA. This number was slightly smaller in the earlier parts of our sample period
but the basic methodology described in the following did not change substantially (see Statistics Canada,
2001, 2012a).
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(and by necessity), the sample from which price quotes were obtained was thus based on
the set of currently active rms. In a second step, Statistics Canada combined PCGA
price indices into industry-level PPIs using current shipment values as weights.50 The
number of PCGAs indices used as inputs varied across industries but was generally low,
at around 4-5 PCGAs per industry.
The choice of an appropriate deator in the computation of our theoretical moments
depends on what we consider the most appropriate counterpart in the data to the indus-
triesin the model. In the data, an industry at the level of aggregation we are working at
comprises on average only 4-5 PCGAs. In contrast, there were around 40,000 establish-
ments in Canadian manufacturing in 1988, or around 200 per industry. This means that
each PCGA product will be produced by dozens or even hundreds of producers. Thus,
it seems appropriate to associate product varieties in our model with varieties of PCGA
products in the data (with each rm producing one variety of a PCGA product). For
the multi-product rm version of our model, it would seem natural to associate products
with PCGAs and product varieties with PCGA varieties.
Hence, if we associate model varieties with PCGA product varieties, our theoretical
PPI should be calculated following the random sampling procedure outlined above. That
is, we calculate an average price in each period based on a set of active domestic producers
in the period. As discussed, the way in which individual price quotes are weighted varies
by PCGA, but generally gives more weight to producers with larger market shares.
Thus, we compute a theoretical PPI which captures these features while preserving a
tight link to theoretical productivity. Specically, we use the factory gate price charged
by the rm with average productivity, p (~ih) = [i= (i   1)]wh=~ih, where
~ih =
"X
j
NihjP
j Nihj
 
~ihj
i 1# 1i 1 (A.1)
50Note that Statistics Canada did not use chain price indices during our sample period. This seems
to be di¤erent from current methods used in other countries such as the United States (see Statistics
Canada, 2001; Burstein and Cravino, 2014).
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and
~ihj =
1
1 Gih
 
ihj
Z 1
ihj
i 1gih () d =

ai
ai   i + 1
 1
i 1
ihj: (A.2)
As noted by Melitz (2003), ~ihj can be interpreted as a weighted average of rm pro-
ductivities, where the weights reect the relative output shares of rms. Also note that
~ihj is calculated as an average across active rms, reecting the sampling procedure of
Statistics Canada. Thus,
p0ih
pih
=
p (~ih)
p (~0ih)
=
~0ih
~ih
; (A.3)
where
~0ih
~ih
=
8<:
"X
j
 
N 0ihj
Nihj
NihjP
j0 Nihj0
!# 1X
j
"
N 0ihj
Nihj

~0ihj
~ihj
i 1 Nihj  ~ihji 1P
j0 Nihj0
 
~ihj0
i 1
#9=;
1
i 1
:
(A.4)
We do not have data for Nihj, but under the assumption that entry costs are proportional
to some observable destination-specic factor that is exogenous to the model (such as mij
in our baseline model):
NihjP
j Nihj
=
Xihj=

aii
ai i+1

FihjP
j Xihj=

aii
ai i+1

Fihj
=
Xihj=mijP
j Xihj=mij
: (A.5)
From (8) and Nihj =
 
kih=

ihj
ai Mih,
~ihj =

ai
ai   i + 1
 1
i 1
ihj =

ai
ai   i + 1
 1
i 1
kih (Mih)
1
ai N
  1
ai
ihj : (A.6)
We can approximate
Nihj
 
~ihj
i 1P
j0 Nihj0
 
~ihj0
i 1 = (Xihj=mij)
1 i+ai
aiP
j0 (Xihj0=mij0)
1 i+ai
ai
: (A.7)
In an (unreported) robustness check, we also experimented with giving equal weight
to the prices charged by active rms. This means that changes in the PPI are not a¤ected
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by market share reallocations among active producers but will still reect changes in the
set of active rms.51 The resulting PPI is:52
pmih =
1
1 Gih (hh)
Z 1
ihh
pih () dGih () =
i
i   1
 
kih
ihh
! ai Z 1
ihh
 1dGih () =
i
i   1
ai
ai + 1
(ihh)
 1 ;
(A.8)
with growth rate
p^mih = (^

ihh)
 1 : (A.9)
In practice, this alternative approach to constructing the PPI yielded very similar
results to the ones in Table 2, with a GMM objective function value of 91.9835 compared
to 91.7885 for the baseline model.
B Estimation Procedure for ai and i
This appendix describes how we obtain estimates for the elasticity of substitution (i) and
the shape parameter of the Pareto distribution of productivities (ai) from data sources
not used in the model calibration.
We start by noting that total sales by exporting rms can be expressed as rih () =P
j rhj() = 1
 1, which is proportional to  1 (the term 1 is constant across rms).
Since  is distributed Pareto with shape parameter a, sales are distributed Pareto with
shape parameter air = a
i
= (i   1) and cut-o¤ kir = 1 (ki)i 1. Thus, we can estimate
air and i, and then recover a
i
.
51It is unclear how frequently Statistics Canada updated price weights in the earlier years of our sample
(Statistics Canada, 1991; 1993) so this procedure might have relevance here. But price quotes could of
course only be obtained from active rms, so that changes in the set of active rms will inuence price
changes.
52We are assuming here that (i) the prices used to compute this average price index are also measured
at factory gates, and (ii) all rms are sampled with the same probability (hence the lower limit ihh in
the integral sign and the lack of rm-specic weights on individual rm-specic prices).
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Obtaining of  from Firm-level Data
In our baseline model, operating prots (that is, prots net of xed costs) are
o () =
r()

: (B.1)
We use data on operating prots (o) and revenue (r) for US and Canadian rms from
Compustat North America and Compustat Global. We proxy o as operating income
before depreciation and r as net sales.53 From (B.1) we can obtain estimates of  for
each rm in our data. Industry-specic estimates of  are calculated as the median across
all rms within each of our 203 manufacturing industries.
Obtaining ar from Sales Data
Aggregate sales for rms with sales equal or larger than rx are (assuming ar > 1):
Rrx =
Z 1
rx
rv(r)dr =
ark
ar
r
ar   1 (rx)
1 ar : (B.2)
Take the sales value rx that corresponds to the x-th largest rm. The fraction nrx of
rms that are bigger than or equal to this rm is nrx = 1 V (rx). Hence, rx = krn (1=ar)rx .
Taking the ratio to the y th largest rms sales eliminates kr: rxry =

nry
nrx
1=ar
. We do
not have data on rx, but we know the sales volume Rrx dened above (total shipments
times the appropriate concentration ratio):

Rrx
Rry
1=(1 ar)
=

nry
nrx
1=ar
: (B.3)
Solving for ar,
ar =
 
lnnry   lnnrx
 
lnRrx   lnRry

+
 
lnnry   lnnrx
 : (B.4)
53Information on these variables is contained in Compustat North America data items 12 (net sales)
and 13 and 189 (operating income before depreciation and administrative expenses; note that we do not
include the latter in the computation of costs). For Compustat Global, net sales are contained in data
item 1 and operating prots are calculated as operating income plus depreciation plus administrative
expenses (data items 14 plus 11 plus 189).
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If rm x is larger than rm y, we have nry > nrx and Rry > Rrx . Thus, ar > 1 from
above as long as
 
lnRrx   lnRry

+
 
lnnry   lnnrx

> 0, which holds by construction.
We use information from Statistics Canada on the output share accounted for by the
top 4 and 8 enterprises in each Canadian manufacturing industry in our data. Multiplying
these shares with total industry output (Rd) we obtain the total output of the top 4 and
top 8 enterprises which we use as proxies for Rrx. Note that using comparable data for
the US yields qualitatively similar results to the ones reported in Table 2. (Recall that
we are imposing a common shape parameter across countries, so that either of these two
data sources can be used.)
C Alternative Modeling of Tari¤s
Our assumptions about preferences, technology, market power, labour markets and entry
are the same as in our baseline model (see Section 3). As before, we also assume that
homogeneous good is traded freely; supplying it to any market and entering the market
involves no costs. The nal goods Q are still not traded and supplying them or entering
the (domestic) market involves no costs either. A manufacturing industry-i rm based in
country h faces the same xed cost Fihj of supplying country j as in the baseline model.
The key di¤erence to the baseline model is that we now assume that for the va-
rieties produced by the manufacturing industries, iceberg trade costs take the form
 ihj = (1 + cihj) for j 6= h and  ijj = 1. As before, h and j denote the exporting and
importing country, respectively and cihj > 0 denotes naturaltransport costs. Note that
iceberg trade costs now exclude policy-induced trade barriers. We model be separately
in the form of ad-valorem tari¤s tihj > 0 (with Tihj  1 + tihj).
This changes the rms prot maximisation problem to problem to
max ihj =
pihj
1 + tihj
qihj (pihj)  ihjqihj (pihj) 1

 fihj = 1
1 + tihj
p1 iihj P
i 1
ij Eij  ihjp iihj P i 1ij Eij
1

 Fihj;
(C.1)
where pihj denotes the price paid by the consumers of the importing country. The rst
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order condition yields
pihj =
i
i   1 ihjTihj
1

: (C.2)
The resulting expression for the threshold value of productivity ihj that leads country-h
rms to select into market j is:
ihj =
i
i   1
 ihj
Pij

iFihj
mij
 1
i 1
T
i
i 1
ihj : (C.3)
The average productivity of country-h rms exporting to market j, dened as in Melitz
(2003), can be expressed as
~ihj =

ai
ai   i + 1
 1
i 1
ihj: (C.4)
The expected revenue and expected prot that a country-h rm obtains in country j,
conditional upon selecting into that market, are respectively
E

rihj ()j  > ihj

= rihj
 
~ihj

=
aiT
 i
ihj
ai   i + 1
 
i
i   1 ihj
1
Pijihj
!1 i
Eij =
aii
ai   i + 1
Fihj;(C.5)
E

ihj ()j  > ihj

=
rihj
 
~ihj

i
  Fihj = i   1
ai   i + 1
Fihj: (C.6)
Country-h exports to country j can be expressed as
Xihj = Nihjrihj
 
~ihj

= Nihj
aii
ai   i + 1
Fihj: (C.7)
The industrys aggregate sales are then
Rih =
X
j
Xihj =
X
j
Nihj
aii
ai   i + 1
Fihj: (C.8)
The mass of country-h rms that select into market j is given by
Nihj =
 
kih
ihj
!ai
Mh: (C.9)
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. 
A
cc
ep
te
d 
A
rt
ic
le
 
 
 
Expected prots, aggregated across all destination markets, are
ih =
X
j
prob
 
 > ihj

E

ihj ()j  > ihj

=
X
j
 
kih
ihj
!ai
i   1
ai   i + 1
Fihj: (C.10)
Industry prots are therefore
Mihih = Mih
X
j
 
kih
ihj
!ai
i   1
ai   i + 1
Fihj =
i   1
aii
X
j
Xihj: (C.11)
Industry employment can be easily shown to be
Lih = MihE [lihj ()] = Mih
X
j
 
kih
ihj
!ai
E

lihj ()j  > ihj

= aiMihih: (C.12)
and the price level Pij is given by
Pij =
24 ai
ai   i + 1
X
h
Nihj
 
i
i   1
 ihjTihj
ihj
!1 i35 11 i : (C.13)
The expressions for industry level of growth rates are unchanged except for the price
index equation:
P^ij =
"X
h
TihjXihjP
h TihjXihj
N^ihj

T^ihj
1 i  
^ihj
i 1# 11 i : (C.14)
It is easy to show that
P^ij =
"X
h
TihjXihjP
h TihjXihj

T^ihj
1  i
i 1a
i

# 1=ai
: (C.15)
We can use the system (C.15) to solve for the growth rates of the price levels P^ij as a
function of the changes in tari¤s T^ihj. From equations (C.3), we can solve for ^

ihj as a
function of P^ij and T^ihj,
^ihj =

T^ihj
 i
i 1
P^ij
: (C.16)
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and thereafter generate predictions for the industry aggregates of interest.
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Figures and Table 
Figure 1: Increases in Trade Flows and Labor Productivity in Canada, 1988-1996 
 
 
Notes: Figures show trade and labor productivity growth at the sectoral level (203 sectors) in 
Canadian manufacturing, 1988 to 1996. Trade is measured as Canadian exports plus imports,labor 
productivity is calculated as value added in production activities divided by total hours worked by 
production workers(see Section 4.1 for details). All data are expressed in 1992 Canadian dollars using 
4-digit industry price and value added deflators, and the 1992 US-Canadian exchange rate.  
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Figure 2: Moment Deviations as a Function of aγ and σ (Trade and Productivity 
Growth, First Moment; Baseline Model) 
 
 
Notes: See Section 4 for details.  
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Figure 3: Moment Deviations as a Function of aγ and σ (Trade and Productivity 
Growth, First Moment; Alternative Modeling of Tariffs) 
 
 
Notes: See Section 4 for details.  
0
10
20
30
40
0
10
20
30
40
-5
0
5
10
15
sigmaa
d
e
v
(d
X
)
0
10
20
30
40
05101520253035
-0.3
-0.29
-0.28
-0.27
-0.26
-0.25
sigmaa
d
e
v
(d
V
A
L d
)
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. 
A
cc
ep
te
d 
A
rt
ic
le
 
 
 
Table 1: Empirical Moments to Be Matched 
Moment Mean(dX) Mean(dVAL) Cov(dX,dVAL) Var(dX) Var(dVAL) 
Data 1.1820 0.3041 0.1007 3.0130 0.1153 
Notes: Table shows empirical moments to be matched by our theoretical models. 'dX' denotes trade 
growth and 'dVAL' labor productivity growth (see Figure 1 and Section 4 for details). 
Table 2: Results for Baseline Model (Matching Growth Rates 1988-1996) 
Moments Mean(dX) Mean(dVAL) Cov(dX,dVAL) Var(dX) Var(dVAL) 
(1) Data  1.1820 0.3041 0.1007 3.0130 0.1153 
(2) Model – Observed 
Parameter Values 
0.3088 0.0139 0.0007 0.3373 0.0002 
(3) Model – Optimised 
Parameter Values (First 
Step) 
1.1408 0.0177 0.0039 3.0185 0.0002 
(4) Model – Optimised 
Parameter Values (GMM) 
1.0538 0.0174 0.0034 2.4004 0.0002 
      
Parameters Optimised 
(value, SE) 
Data (mean, 
sd) 
   
Σ 8.4942 3.4611    
 (121.9231) (0.8765)    
aγ 14.2482 5.0951    
 (1.1253)*** (2.6032)    
      
GMM objective (p-value) 91.7885     
 (0.00000)     
Notes: dX denotes trade growth and dVAL' labor productivity growth (see Section 4 for details). 
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Table 3: Results for Baseline Model (Higher aγ and σ) 
Moments Mean(dX) Mean(dVAL) Cov(dX,dVAL) Var(dX) Var(dVAL) 
(1) Data  1.1820 0.3041 0.1007 3.0130 0.1153 
(2) Model – Observed 
Parameter Values (σ x1.5) 
0.7005 0.0153 0.0041 3.7584 0.0002 
(3) Model – Observed 
Parameter Values (σ x2) 
1.3797 0.0169 0.0164 29.4970 0.0002 
(3) Model – Observed 
Parameter Values (σ x1.88, 
match mean trade growth) 
1.1820 0.0165 0.0125 18.6332 0.0002 
(4) Model – Observed 
Parameter Values (ar x1.5) 
0.5674 0.0149 0.0022 1.9818 0.0002 
(5) Model – Observed 
Parameter Values (ar x 2) 
0.9529 0.0158 0.0077 9.6694 0.0002 
(6) Model – Observed 
Parameter Values (ar x2.23, 
match mean trade growth) 
1.1820 0.0163 0.0122 18.5781 0.0002 
Notes: dX denotes trade growth and dVAL' labor productivity growth (see Section 4 for details).  
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Table 4: Results for Baseline Model (Drop Outliers) 
Panel A: drop top and bottom 5% 
Moments Mean(dX) Mean(dVAL) Cov(dX,dVAL) Var(dX) Var(dVAL) 
(1) Data  0.9737 0.2858 0.0372 0.6675 0.0453 
(2) Model – Observed 
Parameter Values 
0.2893 0.0153 0.0005 0.1440 0.0002 
(3) Model – Optimised 
Parameter Values (First 
Step) 
0.7657 0.0171 0.0007 0.7436 0.0002 
(4) Model – Optimised 
Parameter Values 
0.8085 0.0183 0.0015 0.8770 0.0002 
      
Parameters Optimised 
(value, SE) 
Data (mean, 
sd) 
   
Σ 7.0894 3.5161    
 (72.9391) (0.9040)    
aγ 12.5859 5.1936    
 (0.8968)*** (2.5479)    
      
GMM objective (p-value) 107.378     
 (0.00000)     
Panel B: drop top 5% only 
(5) Data 0.8739 0.2495 0.0542 0.7049 0.0553 
(6) Model – Observed 
Parameter Values 
0.2679 0.0143 0.0006 0.1325 0.0002 
(7) Model – Optimised 
Parameter Values (First 
Step) 
0.7365 0.0162 0.0013 0.7526 0.0002 
(8) Model – Optimised 
Parameter Values 
0.7606 0.0172 0.0021 0.8324 0.0002 
      
Parameters Optimised 
(value, SE) 
Data (mean, 
sd) 
   
Σ 7.1215 3.5011    
 (80.0526) (0.8933)    
aγ 12.6347 5.1776    
 (0.9331)*** (2.5549)    
      
GMM objective (p-value) 112.996     
 (0.00000)     
Notes: dX denotes trade growth and dVAL' labor productivity growth (see Section 4 for details).  
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Table 5: Results for Baseline Model (Prices at Factory Gate) 
Moments Mean(dX) Mean(dVAL) Cov(dX,dVAL) Var(dX) Var(dVAL) 
(1) Data  1.1820 0.3041 0.1007 3.0130 0.1153 
(2) Model – Observed 
Parameter Values 
0.3857 0.0171 0.0005 0.4862 0.0002 
(3) Model – Optimised 
Parameter Values 
(First Step) 
1.1631 0.0198 0.0016 3.0156 0.0003 
(4) Model – Optimised 
Parameter Values 
(GMM) 
1.0653 0.0196 0.0014 2.3443 0.0003 
      
Parameters Optimised 
(value, SE) 
Data (mean, sd)    
Σ 8.0972 3.4611    
 (127.1901) (0.8765)    
aγ 13.2980 5.0951    
 (1.3123)*** (2.6032)    
      
GMM objective (p-
value) 
90.6741     
 (0.00000)     
Notes: dX denotes trade growth and dVAL' labor productivity growth (see Section 4 for details). 
 
Table 6: Results for Baseline Model (Alternative Modeling Approach to Tariffs) 
Moments Mean(dX) Mean(dVAL) Cov(dX,dVAL) Var(dX) Var(dVAL) 
(1) Data  1.1820 0.3041 0.1007 3.0130 0.1153 
(2) Model – Observed 
Parameter Values 
0.5154 0.0191 0.0029 1.3670 0.0003 
(3) Model – Optimised 
Parameter Values 
(First Step) 
1.1584 0.0330 0.0058 3.0195 0.0009 
(4) Model – Optimised 
Parameter Values 
(GMM) 
1.0705 0.0323 0.0050 2.3986 0.0009 
      
Parameters Optimised 
(value, SE) 
Data (mean, sd)    
Σ 2.0101 3.4611    
 (1.5114) (0.8765)    
aγ 7.1208 5.0951    
 (5.3689) (2.6032)    
      
GMM objective (p-
value) 
85.6412     
 (0.00000)     
Notes: dX denotes trade growth and dVAL' labor productivity growth (see Section 4 for details).  
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Table 7: Results for Baseline Model (First Differences 1980-1988 to 1988-1996) 
Moments Mean(dX) Mean(dVAL) Cov(dX,dVAL) Var(dX) Var(dVAL) 
(1) Data  0.4621 0.1095 0.0493 0.6642 0.1193 
(2) Model – Observed 
Parameter Values 
0.1367 0.0062 0.0011 0.0649 0.0002 
(3) Model – Optimised 
Parameter Values (First 
Step) 
0.5216 0.0112 0.0078 0.6409 0.0004 
(4) Model – Optimised 
Parameter Values 
(GMM) 
0.4772 0.0104 0.0064 0.5376 0.0003 
      
Parameters Optimised 
(value, SE) 
Data (mean, sd)    
Σ 11.1387 3.4611    
 (488.2403) (0.8765)    
aγ 19.9583 5.0951    
 (3.8789)*** (2.6032)    
      
GMM objective (p-
value) 
95.5912     
 (0.00000)     
Notes: dX denotes trade growth and dVAL' labor productivity growth (see Section 4 for details). 
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Table 8: Results for Baseline Model (Diff-in-Diff Predicted Values) 
Moments Mean(dX) Mean(dVAL) Cov(dX,dVAL) Var(dX) Var(dVAL) 
(1) Data  0.1457 0.0104 0.0087 0.0576 0.0044 
(2) Model – Observed 
Parameter Values 
0.1072 0.0032 0.0008 0.0292 0.0000 
(3) Model – Optimised 
Parameter Values (First 
Step) 
0.1487 0.0035 0.0013 0.0537 0.0000 
(4) Model – Optimised 
Parameter Values 
(GMM) 
0.1411 0.0017 0.0005 0.0483 0.0000 
      
Parameters Optimised 
(value, SE) 
Data (mean, sd)    
Σ 8.2290 3.4611    
 (1.9631)*** (0.8765)    
aγ 7.2313 5.0951    
 (0.0983)*** (2.6032)    
      
GMM objective (p-
value) 
42.3101     
 (0.00000)     
Notes: dX denotes trade growth and dVAL' labor productivity growth (see Section 4 for details).  
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Table 9: Results for Baseline Model (Changes in Non-Tariff Trade Costs) 
Moments Mean(dX) Mean(dVAL) Cov(dX,dVAL) Var(dX) Var(dVAL) 
(1) Data  1.1820 0.3041 0.1007 3.0130 0.1153 
(2) Model – Observed 
Parameter Values (c=1.1) 
0.2055 0.0027 0.0073 1.5017 0.0004 
(3) Model – Observed 
Parameter Values (c=0.9) 
2.4642 0.0679 0.0481 65.7687 0.0029 
(4) Model – Observed 
Parameter Values (c=0.98)) 
1.1820 0.0367 0.0225 15.0791 0.0011 
(3) Model – Optimised 
Parameter Values (First 
Step) 
1.1878 0.0187 0.0037 3.0124 0.0003 
(4) Model – Optimised 
Parameter Values (GMM) 
0.8924 0.2948 -0.0116 0.0582 0.0849 
      
Parameters Optimised 
(value, SE) 
    
Σ 1.0100     
 (0.5206)*     
aγ 0.7209     
 (0.1059)***     
c 0.4322     
 (0.0364)***     
      
GMM objective (p-value) 9.7516     
 (0.0076)     
Notes: dX denotes trade growth and dVAL' labor productivity growth (see Section 4 for details). 
Table 10: Results for Baseline Model with Free Entry 
Moments Mean(dX) Mean(dVAL) Cov(dX,dVAL) Var(dX) Var(dVAL) 
(1) Data  1.1820 0.3041 0.1007 3.0130 0.1153 
(2) Model – Observed 
Parameter Values 
0.3455 0.0076 0.0007 0.3877 0.0001 
(3) Model – Optimised 
Parameter Values (First 
Step) 
1.2533 0.0091 0.0116 3.2869 0.0002 
(4) Model – Optimised 
Parameter Values (GMM) 
1.1451 0.0090 0.0089 2.4802 0.0001 
      
Parameters Optimised 
(value, SE) 
Data (mean, sd)    
σ 8.3205 3.4611    
 (90.6883) (0.8765)    
aγ 13.1861 5.0951    
 (0.8983) (2.6032)    
      
GMM objective (p-value) 83.2979 
(0.0000) 
    
Notes: dX denotes trade growth and dVAL' labor productivity growth (see Section 5 for details).  
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Table 11: Results for the ‘General Equilibrium’ Extension 
Moments Mean(dX) Mean(dVAL) Cov(dX,dVAL) Var(dX) Var(dVAL) 
(1) Data  1.1820 0.3041 0.1007 3.0130 0.1153 
(2) Model – Observed 
Parameter Values 
0.3533 0.0088 0.0005 0.3863 0.0001 
(3) Model – Optimised 
Parameter Values (First 
Step) 
1.1310 0.0098 0.0147 3.2430 0.0001 
(4) Model – Optimised 
Parameter Values 
(GMM) 
0.9590 0.0119 0.0122 1.9985 0.0002 
      
Parameters Optimised 
(value, SE) 
Data (mean, sd)    
Σ 7.1959 3.4611    
 (68.4995) (0.8765)    
aγ 11.5299 5.0951    
 (0.0796)*** (2.6032)    
      
GMM objective (p-
value) 
83.5599 
(0.0000) 
    
Notes: dX denotes trade growth and dVAL' labor productivity growth (see Section 5 for details). 
 
Table 12: Results for the ‘Intermediate Inputs’ Extension 
Moments Mean(dX) Mean(dVAL) Cov(dX,dVAL) Var(dX) Var(dVAL) 
(1) Data  1.1820 0.3041 0.1007 3.0130 0.1153 
(2) Model – Observed 
Parameter Values 
0.3541 0.0295 0.0100 0.5171 0.0020 
(3) Model – Optimised 
Parameter Values (First 
Step) 
1.2208 0.0466 0.0245 2.9930 0.0013 
(4) Model – Optimised 
Parameter Values 
(GMM) 
1.4581 0.1470 0.2139 3.7357 0.0393 
      
Parameters Optimised 
(value, SE) 
Data (mean, sd)    
Σ 12.9013 3.4611    
 (0.0211)*** (0.8765)    
aγ 11.9700 5.0951    
 (0.0018)*** (2.6032)    
α 0.9871 0.7065    
 (0.0025)*** (0.0918)    
      
GMM objective (p-
value) 
44.8265 
(0.0000) 
    
Notes: dX denotes trade growth and dVAL' labor productivity growth (see Section 5 for details).  
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Table 13: Results for the Multiproduct-Firm Model 
Moments Mean(dX) Mean(dVAL) Cov(dX,dVAL) Var(dX) Var(dVAL) 
(1) Data  1.1820 0.3041 0.1007 3.0130 0.1153 
(2) Model – Observed 
Parameter Values 
-- -- -- -- -- 
(3) Model –Optimised 
Parameter Values 
(First Step) 
1.2392 0.2738 0.1552 3.0034 0.0976 
(4) Model – Optimised 
Parameter Values 
(GMM) 
1.2175 0.2855 0.1549 2.8239 0.1073 
      
Parameters Optimised 
(value, SE) 
Data (mean, sd)    
Χ 1.1276 --    
 (0.0786)***     
aγ 8.1552 --    
 (1.1506)***     
aλ 4.9922 --    
 (0.5831)***     
      
GMM objective 
(p-value) 
3.3434 
(0.1879) 
    
Notes: dX denotes trade growth and dVAL' labor productivity growth (see Section 5 for details). 
 
 
Table 14: Out-of-Sample Predictions 
Model 
Parameters Moments d.o.f. 
GMM objective 
in-sample 
(p-value) 
GMM objective 
out-of-sample 
Baseline 2 5 3 
91.7885 
(0.0000) 
99.2693 
Free entry 2 5 3 
83.2979 
(0.0000) 
102.1245 
General equilibrium 2 5 3 
83.5599 
(0.0000) 
90.4165 
Intermediates 3 5 2 
44.2633 
(0.0000) 
106.2829 
Multiproduct 3 5 2 
3.3434 
(0.1879) 
42.7024 
Notes: See Section 5 for details. 
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1 Introduction
This appendix provides a detailed mathematical treatment of the models dis-
cussed in the paper. For simplicity, each model is presented in a self-contained
manner.
2 Baseline model
2.1 Assumptions
2.1.1 Preferences
There are many countries. Each country admits a representative agent, with
preferences
U =
X
i2I
mi lnQi +A; (1)
where mi > 0. A denotes consumption of a homogeneous nal good. Qi denotes
consumption of a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregate (manufacturing) nal good i:1
Qi =
Z
2 i
qi()
id
 1
i
; (2)
where  2 (0; 1) and   1= (1  ) denotes the elasticity of substitution between
any two varieties. Choosing good A as the numéraire, utility maximization on
the upper level yields demand functions A = Y  Pimi and Qi = mi=Pi, where
Y is total expenditure per consumer. In the manufacturing goods sector, utility
maximization yields demand function qi() = pi ()
 
P 1i mi.
1Wherever possible, we dispense with industry index i and with country indexes.
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2.1.2 Technology
The homogeneous good is made with labor l and a linear technology A = lA
that is identical across countries. Manufacturing varieties are made with the
production function qi () = li (), where  denotes (rm-specic) total factor
productivity.  is iid across rms within an industry. For tractability purposes,
we assume  to be distributed Pareto with shape parameter a and location
parameter k . We assume the same shape parameter for an industry across
countries, but allow it to vary across industries. The location parameter is
allowed to vary across industries and countries.
2.1.3 Market power
Producers of the homogeneous good and the nal goods Q operate in a perfectly
competitive environment. Producers of varieties in the manufacturing industry
have instead monopoly power over their own varieties.
2.1.4 Fixed and transport costs
The homogeneous good is traded freely; supplying it to any market and entering
the market involves no costs. We consider equilibria in which all countries
produce positive amounts of this good, thus leading to the equalization of wages
across countries. (We normalize wages to one.) The nal goodsQ are not traded;
supplying them or entering the (domestic) market involves no costs either.
For the varieties produced by the manufacturing industries, we assume ice-
berg transport costs, which take the form hj = (1 + chj) (1 + thj) for j 6= h
and  jj = 1. (h and j denote the exporting and importing country, respec-
tively.) chj denotes natural transport costs, and thj denotes policy-induced
trade barriers. We can safely ignore tari¤ revenue, given the quasi-linear utility
assumption above.
A manufacturing industry-i rm based in country h faces a xed cost Fhj
of supplying country j. Fixed costs are in terms of the destination countrys
labor.
Fixed costs and transport costs are allowed to vary across industries and
country-pairs.
2.1.5 Entry
We assume there is no free entry in the manufacturing sectors: there is a given
mass of rmsM that pick a draw from the distribution of  prior to any decision.
2.1.6 Labor market
The labor market is perfectly competitive.
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2.2 Firm-level and industry outcomes
The pricing decision over the variety produced by a country-h rm with pro-
ductivity  is the usual mark-up over marginal cost. Well-known manipulation
of rm revenue and prot functions yields to the following expression for the
threshold value of productivity hj that leads country-h rms to select into
market j:
hj =

   1
hj
Pj

Fhj
mj
 1
 1
: (3)
The average productivity of country-h rms exporting to market j, dened as
in Melitz (2003), can be expressed as
~hj =

a
a    + 1
 1
 1
hj : (4)
The expected revenue and expected prot that a country-h rm obtains in
country j, conditional upon selecting into that market, are respectively
E

rhj ()j  > hj

= rhj
 
~hj

=
a
a    + 1Fhj ; (5)
E

hj ()j  > hj

=
rhj
 
~hj


  Fhj =    1
a    + 1Fhj : (6)
Country-h exports to country j can be expressed as
Xhj = Nhjrhj
 
~hj

= Nhj
a
a    + 1Fhj : (7)
The industrys aggregate sales are then
Rh =
X
j
Xhj =
X
j
Nhj
a
a    + 1Fhj : (8)
The mass of country-h rms that select into market j is given by
Nhj =
 
kh
hj
!a
Mh: (9)
Expected prots, aggregated across all destination markets, are
h =
X
j
prob
 
 > hj

E

hj ()j  > hj

=
X
j
 
kh
hj
!a
   1
a    + 1Fhj :
(10)
Industry prots are therefore
Mhh = Mh
X
j
 
kh
hj
!a
   1
a    + 1Fhj =
   1
a
X
j
Xhj : (11)
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Industry employment can be easily shown to be
Lh = MhE [lhj ()] = Mh
X
j
 
kh
hj
!a
E

lhj ()j  > hj

= aMhh: (12)
The price level Pj is given by
Pj =
24 a
a    + 1
X
h
Nhj
 

   1
hj
hj
!1 35 11  : (13)
Melitz (2003) denes industry productivity as
~h =
24X
j
NhjP
j Nhj
 
~hj
 135 1 1 : (14)
2.3 Growth rates
The growth rates of the industrys aggregates can be expressed as functions
of parameter values, changes in hj , changes in thresholds hj , and the lev-
els of bilateral trade Xhj . Dene x^  x0=x as a gross growth rate, where x
and x0 denote, respectively, the values of a variable before and after the trade
liberalization:
X^hj = N^hj =
 
^hj
 a
; (15)
R^h = ^h = L^h =
X
j
XhjP
j Xhj
X^hj ; (16)
P^j =
"X
h
XhjP
hXhj
N^hj (^hj)
1   
^hj
 1# 11 
: (17)
As a measurable proxy for productivity growth, we will consider the growth rate
of deated value added per worker,
R^h
L^h
p (~h)
p
 
~0h
 = R^h
L^h
~0h
~h
=
~0h
~h
; (18)
where we use the price charged by the rm with average productivity p (~h) as
a deator. (See Section 3 and Appendix A in the paper for a detailed discussion
of the appropriate choice of deator.) The growth rate ~0h=~h can be written as
~0h
~h
=
264
0@X
j
 
N 0hj
Nhj
NhjP
j0 Nhj0
!1A 1X
j
24N 0hj
Nhj
 
~0hj
~hj
! 1
Nhj
 
~hj
 1P
j0 Nhj0
 
~hj0
 1
35
375
1
 1
:
(19)
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We do not have data for Nhj , but under the assumption that entry costs are
proportional to some observable destination-specic factor that is exogenous to
the model (such as mj , GDP, population, area,...):
NhjP
j0 Nhj0
=
Xhj=

a
a +1

FhjP
j0 Xhj0=

a
a +1

Fhj0
=
Xhj=mjP
j0 Xhj0=mj0
: (20)
From (4) and (9),
~hj =

a
a    + 1
 1
 1
hj =

a
a    + 1
 1
 1
kh (Mh)
1
a N
  1a
hj : (21)
We can approximate
Nhj
 
~hj
 1P
j0 Nhj0
 
~hj0
 1 = (Xhj=mj)
1 +a
aP
j0 (Xhj0=mj0)
1 +a
a
: (22)
2.4 Predictions
It is easy to show that
P^j =
"X
h
XhjP
hXhj
^
 a
hj
# 1=a
: (23)
We can use the system (23) to solve for the growth rates of the price levels P^j
as a function of the changes in transport costs ^hj . From equations (3), we can
solve for ^hj as a function of P^j and ^hj ,
^hj = ^hj=P^j ; (24)
and thereafter generate predictions for the industry aggregates of interest.
3 Free entry
3.1 Assumptions
3.1.1 Preferences
There are many countries. Each country admits a representative agent, with
preferences
U =
X
i2I
mi lnQi +A; (25)
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where mi > 0. A denotes consumption of a homogeneous nal good. Qi denotes
consumption of a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregate (manufacturing) nal good i:2
Qi =
Z
2 i
qi()
id
 1
i
; (26)
where  2 (0; 1) and   1= (1  ) denotes the elasticity of substitution between
any two varieties. Choosing good A as the numéraire, utility maximization on
the upper level yields demand functions A = Y  Pimi and Qi = mi=Pi, where
Y is total expenditure per consumer. In the manufacturing goods sector, utility
maximization yields demand function qi() = pi ()
 
P 1i mi.
3.1.2 Technology
The homogeneous good is made with labor l and a linear technology A = lA
that is identical across countries. Manufacturing varieties are made with the
production function qi () = li (), where  denotes (rm-specic) total factor
productivity.  is iid across rms within an industry. For tractability purposes,
we assume  to be distributed Pareto with shape parameter a and location
parameter k . We assume the same shape parameter for an industry across
countries, but allow it to vary across industries. The location parameter is
allowed to vary across industries and countries.
3.1.3 Market power
Producers of the homogeneous good and the nal goods Q operate in a perfectly
competitive environment. Producers of varieties in the manufacturing industry
have instead monopoly power over their own varieties.
3.1.4 Fixed and transport costs
The homogeneous good is traded freely; supplying it to any market and entering
the market involves no costs. We consider equilibria in which all countries
produce positive amounts of this good, thus leading to the equalization of wages
across countries. (We normalize wages to one.) The nal goodsQ are not traded;
supplying them or entering the (domestic) market involves no costs either.
For the varieties produced by the manufacturing industries, we assume ice-
berg transport costs, which take the form hj = (1 + chj) (1 + thj) for j 6= h
and  jj = 1. (h and j denote the exporting and importing country, respec-
tively.) chj denotes natural transport costs, and thj denotes policy-induced
trade barriers. We can safely ignore tari¤ revenue, given the quasi-linear utility
assumption above.
A manufacturing industry-i rm based in country h faces a xed cost Fhj
of supplying country j. Fixed costs are in terms of the destination countrys
labor.
2Wherever possible, we dispense with industry index i and with country indexes.
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Fixed costs and transport costs are allowed to vary across industries and
country-pairs.
3.1.5 Entry
We assume free entry: the mass of rms Mji active in an industry is the result
of rms comparing expected prots with the xed cost Fji (in terms of country
js labor) that they have to pay in order to pick a draw from the distribution
of . Fji is allowed to vary across industries and countries.
3.1.6 Labor market
The labor market is perfectly competitive.
3.2 Firm-level and industry outcomes
The pricing decision over the variety produced by a country-h rm with pro-
ductivity  is the usual mark-up over marginal cost. Well-known manipulation
of rm revenue and prot functions yields to the following expression for the
threshold value of productivity hj that leads country-h rms to select into
market j:
hj =

   1
hj
Pj

Fhj
mj
 1
 1
: (27)
The average productivity of country-h rms exporting to market j, dened as
in Melitz (2003), can be expressed as
~hj =

a
a    + 1
 1
 1
hj : (28)
The expected revenue and expected prot that a country-h rm obtains in
country j, conditional upon selecting into that market, are respectively
E

rhj ()j  > hj

= rhj
 
~hj

=
a
a    + 1Fhj ; (29)
E

hj ()j  > hj

=
rhj
 
~hj


  Fhj =    1
a    + 1Fhj : (30)
Country-h exports to country j can be expressed as
Xhj = Nhjrhj
 
~hj

= Nhj
a
a    + 1Fhj : (31)
The industrys aggregate sales are then
Rh =
X
j
Xhj =
X
j
Nhj
a
a    + 1Fhj : (32)
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. 
A
cc
ep
te
d 
A
rt
ic
le
 
 
 
The mass of country-h rms that select into market j is given by
Nhj =
 
kh
hj
!a
Mh: (33)
The free-entry condition sets expected prots equal to the xed cost Fh:X
j
prob
 
 > hj

E

hj ()j  > hj

= Fh: (34)
Industry employment can be easily shown to be
Lh = MhE [lhj ()] = Mh
X
j
 
kh
hj
!a
E

lhj ()j  > hj

=
   1

Rh: (35)
The price level Pj is given by
Pj =
24 a
a    + 1
X
h
Nhj
 

   1
hj
hj
!1 35 11  : (36)
Melitz (2003) denes industry productivity as
~h =
24X
j
NhjP
j Nhj
 
~hj
 135 1 1 : (37)
3.3 Growth rates
The growth rates of the industrys aggregates can be expressed as functions
of parameter values, changes in hj , changes in thresholds hj , and the lev-
els of bilateral trade Xhj . Dene x^  x0=x as a gross growth rate, where x
and x0 denote, respectively, the values of a variable before and after the trade
liberalization:
X^hj = N^hj =
 
^hj
 a
M^h; (38)
R^h = L^h =
X
j
XhjP
j Xhj
X^hj ; (39)
P^j =
"X
h
XhjP
hXhj
N^hj (^hj)
1   
^hj
 1# 11 
: (40)
As a measurable proxy for productivity growth, we will consider the growth rate
of deated value added per worker,
R^h
L^h
p (~h)
p
 
~0h
 = R^h
L^h
~0h
~h
=
~0h
~h
; (41)
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where we use the price charged by the rm with average productivity p (~h) as
a deator. (See Section 3 and Appendix A in the paper for a detailed discussion
of the appropriate choice of deator.) The growth rate ~0h=~h can be written as
~0h
~h
=
264
0@X
j
 
N 0hj
Nhj
NhjP
j0 Nhj0
!1A 1X
j
24N 0hj
Nhj
 
~0hj
~hj
! 1
Nhj
 
~hj
 1P
j0 Nhj0
 
~hj0
 1
35
375
1
 1
:
(42)
We do not have data for Nhj , but under the assumption that entry costs are
proportional to some observable destination-specic factor that is exogenous to
the model (such as mj , GDP, population, area,...):
NhjP
j Nhj
=
Xhj=

a
a +1

FhjP
j Xhj=

a
a +1

Fhj
=
Xhj=mjP
j Xhj=mj
: (43)
From (28) and (33),
~hj =

a
a    + 1
 1
 1
hj =

a
a    + 1
 1
 1
kh (Mh)
1
a N
  1a
hj : (44)
We can approximate
Nhj
 
~hj
 1P
j0 Nhj0
 
~hj0
 1 = (Xhj=mj)
1 +a
aP
j0 (Xhj0=mj0)
1 +a
a
: (45)
3.4 Predictions
Manipulating the growth rates of the free-entry condition and the price level,
1 =
X
j
XhjP
nXhn
^
 a
hj P^
a
j ; (46)
P^
 a
j =
X
h
XhjP
hXhj
M^h^
 a
hj : (47)
Once we have the values of P^j and M^j , we can generate the models predictions
for all variables of interest.
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4 Intermediate inputs
4.1 Assumptions
4.1.1 Preferences
There are many countries. Each country admits a representative agent, with
preferences
U =
X
i2I
mi lnQ
c
i +A; (48)
wheremi > 0. A denotes consumption of a homogeneous nal good. Qci denotes
consumption of a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregate (manufacturing) nal good Qi:3
Qi =
Z
2 i
qi()
id
 1
i
; (49)
where  2 (0; 1) and   1= (1  ) denotes the elasticity of substitution between
any two varieties. Choosing good A as the numéraire, utility maximization on
the upper level yields demand functions A = Y  Pimi and Qi = mi=Pi, where
Y is total expenditure per consumer. In the manufacturing goods sector, utility
maximization yields demand function qi() = pi ()
 
P 1i mi.
4.1.2 Technology
The homogeneous good is made with labor l and a linear technology A = lA
that is identical across countries. Manufacturing varieties are made with the
following production function:
qi () = 
"
Qinputi ()

# 
l ()
1  
1 
: (50)
Qinputi denotes the amount of the aggregate manufacturing good used as an
intermediate input;  2 [0; 1);  denotes (rm-specic) total factor productivity
and is iid across rms within an industry. For tractability purposes, we assume
 to be distributed Pareto with shape parameter a and location parameter
k . We assume the same shape parameter for an industry across countries, but
allow it to vary across industries. The location parameter is allowed to vary
across industries and countries.
4.1.3 Market power
Producers of the homogeneous good and the nal goods Q operate in a perfectly
competitive environment. Producers of varieties in the manufacturing industry
have instead monopoly power over their own varieties.
3Wherever possible, we dispense with industry index i and with country indexes.
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4.1.4 Fixed and transport costs
The homogeneous good is traded freely; supplying it to any market and entering
the market involves no costs. We consider equilibria in which all countries
produce positive amounts of this good, thus leading to the equalization of wages
across countries. (We normalize wages to one.) The nal goodsQ are not traded;
supplying them or entering the (domestic) market involves no costs either.
For the varieties produced by the manufacturing industries, we assume ice-
berg transport costs, which take the form hj = (1 + chj) (1 + thj) for j 6= h
and  jj = 1. (h and j denote the exporting and importing country, respec-
tively.) chj denotes natural transport costs, and thj denotes policy-induced
trade barriers. We can safely ignore tari¤ revenue, given the quasi-linear utility
assumption above.
A manufacturing industry-i rm based in country h faces a xed cost Fhj
of supplying country j. Fixed costs are in terms of the destination countrys
labor.
Fixed costs and transport costs are allowed to vary across industries and
country-pairs.
4.1.5 Entry
We assume there is no free entry in the manufacturing sectors: there is a given
mass of rmsM that pick a draw from the distribution of  prior to any decision.
4.1.6 Labor market
The labor market is perfectly competitive.
4.2 Firm-level and industry outcomes
The pricing decision over the variety produced by a country-h rm with pro-
ductivity  is the usual mark-up over marginal cost. Well-known manipulation
of rm revenue and prot functions yields to the following expression for the
threshold value of productivity hj that leads country-h rms to select into
market j:
hj =

   1
hjP

h
Pj

Fhj
Ej
 1
 1
; (51)
where Ej = mj + PjQ
input
j . The average productivity of country-h rms ex-
porting to market j, dened as in Melitz (2003), can be expressed as
~hj =

a
a    + 1
 1
 1
hj : (52)
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The expected revenue and expected prot that a country-h rm obtains in
country j, conditional upon selecting into that market, are respectively
E

rhj ()j  > hj

= rhj
 
~hj

=
a
a    + 1Fhj ; (53)
E

hj ()j  > hj

=
rhj
 
~hj


  Fhj =    1
a    + 1Fhj : (54)
Country-h exports to country j can be expressed as
Xhj = Nhjrhj
 
~hj

= Nhj
a
a    + 1Fhj : (55)
The industrys aggregate sales are then
Rh =
X
j
Xhj =
X
j
Nhj
a
a    + 1Fhj : (56)
The mass of country-h rms that select into market j is given by
Nhj =
 
kh
hj
!a
Mh: (57)
Expected prots, aggregated across all destination markets, are
h =
X
j
prob
 
 > hj

E

hj ()j  > hj

=
X
j
 
kh
hj
!a
   1
a    + 1Fhj :
(58)
Industry prots are therefore
Mhh = Mh
X
j
 
kh
hj
!a
   1
a    + 1Fhj =
   1
a
X
j
Xhj : (59)
Industry employment can be easily shown to be
Lh = MhE [lhj ()] = Mh
X
j
 
kh
hj
!a
E

lhj ()j  > hj

= (1  ) aMhh:
(60)
Similarly, industry demand for intermediate input Qinput can be shown to be
Qinputh = MhE
h
Qinputh ()
i
=
a
Ph
Mhh:
The price level Pj is given by
Pj =
24 a
a    + 1
X
h
Nhj
 

   1
hjP

h
hj
!1 35 11  : (61)
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Melitz (2003) denes industry productivity as
~h =
24X
j
NhjP
j Nhj
 
~hj
 135 1 1 : (62)
4.3 Growth rates
The growth rates of the industrys aggregates can be expressed as functions
of parameter values, changes in hj , changes in thresholds hj , and the lev-
els of bilateral trade Xhj . Dene x^  x0=x as a gross growth rate, where x
and x0 denote, respectively, the values of a variable before and after the trade
liberalization:
X^hj = N^hj =
 
^hj
 a
; (63)
R^h = ^h = L^h =
X
j
XhjP
j Xhj
X^hj ; (64)
P^j =
"X
h
XhjP
hXhj
N^hj (^hj)
1 

P^h
1   
^hj
 1# 11 
: (65)
Our measurable proxy for industry productivity, deated value added per worker,
is now dened as4
V Ah
p (~h)Lh
=
Rh   PhQinputh
p (~h)Lh
: (66)
Taking growth rates,
R^jRj   PjQinputj ^j
V A
1
P^j

L^j
~0
~
=

P^j
  ~0
~
(67)
The growth rate ~0h=~h can be written as
~0h
~h
=
264
0@X
j
 
N 0hj
Nhj
NhjP
j0 Nhj0
!1A 1X
j
24N 0hj
Nhj
 
~0hj
~hj
! 1
Nhj
 
~hj
 1P
j0 Nhj0
 
~hj0
 1
35
375
1
 1
:
(68)
We do not have data for Nhj , but under the assumption that entry costs are
proportional to some observable destination-specic factor that is exogenous to
the model (such as mj , GDP, population, area,...):
NhjP
j Nhj
=
Xhj=

a
a +1

FhjP
j Xhj=

a
a +1

Fhj
=
Xhj=mjP
j Xhj=mj
: (69)
4See Section 3 and Appendix A in the paper for a detailed discussion of the appropriate
choice of deator.
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From (52) and (57),
~hj =

a
a    + 1
 1
 1
hj =

a
a    + 1
 1
 1
kh (Mh)
1
a N
  1a
hj : (70)
We can approximate
Nhj
 
~hj
 1P
j0 Nhj0
 
~hj0
 1 = (Xhj=mj)
1 +a
aP
j0 (Xhj0=mj0)
1 +a
a
: (71)
4.4 Predictions
The price equation in changes can be rewritten as
P^
a
 1
j =

E^j
 a 1
(1 )2
"X
h
XhjP
mXmj
^
 a
hj
1
P^
a
h
# 1
1 
; (72)
where
E^j =
1
Ej
"
mj + PjQ
input
j P^
 a
j
 X
h
XjhP
hXjh
^
 a
jh P^
a
h E^
a
 1
h
!#
: (73)
This yields a system of non-linear equations in P^j and E^j . Once we have P^: and
E^, we can solve for the remaining growth rates in the following order: ^jj , ^

hj ,
N^hj , X^hj , ^j , and thus R^j , L^j and Q^
input
j .
5 General equilibrium
5.1 Assumptions
5.1.1 Preferences
There are many countries. Each country admits a representative agent, with
preferences
U =
Y
i
Q
i
i ; (74)
where i > 0,
P
i i = 1. Qi denotes consumption of a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregate
(manufacturing) nal good i:5
Qi =
Z
2 i
qi()
id
 1
i
; (75)
where  2 (0; 1) and   1= (1  ) denotes the elasticity of substitution between
any two varieties.
5Wherever possible, we dispense with industry index i and with country indexes.
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5.1.2 Technology
Manufacturing varieties are made with the production function qi () = li (),
where  denotes (rm-specic) total factor productivity.  is iid across rms
within an industry. For tractability purposes, we assume  to be distributed
Pareto with shape parameter a and location parameter k . We assume the
same shape parameter for an industry across countries, but allow it to vary
across industries. The location parameter is allowed to vary across industries
and countries.
5.1.3 Market power
Producers of the nal goods Q operate in a perfectly competitive environment.
Producers of varieties in the manufacturing industry have instead monopoly
power over their own varieties.
5.1.4 Fixed and transport costs
The nal goods Q are not traded; supplying them or entering the (domestic)
market involves no costs either.
For the varieties produced by the manufacturing industries, we assume ice-
berg transport costs, which take the form hj = (1 + chj) (1 + thj) for j 6= h
and  jj = 1. (h and j denote the exporting and importing country, respec-
tively.) chj denotes natural transport costs, and thj denotes policy-induced
trade barriers. We ignore tari¤ revenue for comparability purposes with the rest
of the models.6
A manufacturing industry-i rm based in country h faces a xed cost Fhj
of supplying country j. Fixed costs are in terms of the destination countrys
labor.
Fixed costs and transport costs are allowed to vary across industries and
country-pairs.
5.1.5 Entry
We assume free entry: the mass of rms Mji active in an industry is the result
of rms comparing expected prots with the xed cost Fji (in terms of country
js labor) that they have to pay in order to pick a draw from the distribution
of . Fji is allowed to vary across industries and countries.
5.1.6 Labor market
The labor market is perfectly competitive. In each country j, Lj units of labor
are supplied inelastically.
6Modeling tari¤ revenue in terms of lump-sum transfers to the levying countrys consumers
does not change the models quantitative implications signicantly. Results available from the
authors upon request.
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. 
A
cc
ep
te
d 
A
rt
ic
le
 
 
 
5.2 Firm-level and industry outcomes
The pricing decision over the variety produced by a country-h rm with pro-
ductivity  is the usual mark-up over marginal cost. Well-known manipulation
of rm revenue and prot functions yields to the following expression for the
threshold value of productivity hj that leads country-h rms to select into
market j:
hj =

   1
hjwh
Pj

wjFhj
jwjLj
 1
 1
: (76)
The average productivity of country-h rms exporting to market j, dened as
in Melitz (2003), can be expressed as
~hj =

a
a    + 1
 1
 1
hj : (77)
The expected revenue and expected prot that a country-h rm obtains in
country j, conditional upon selecting into that market, are respectively
E

rhj ()j  > hj

= rhj
 
~hj

=
a
a    + 1wjFhj ; (78)
E

hj ()j  > hj

=
rhj
 
~hj


  Fhj =    1
a    + 1wjFhj : (79)
Country-h exports to country j can be expressed as
Xhj = Nhjrhj
 
~hj

= Nhj
a
a    + 1wjFhj : (80)
The industrys aggregate sales are then
Rh =
X
j
Xhj =
X
j
Nhj
a
a    + 1wjFhj : (81)
The mass of country-h rms that select into market j is given by
Nhj =
 
kh
hj
!a
Mh: (82)
The free-entry condition sets expected prots equal to the xed cost Fh:X
j
prob
 
 > hj

E

hj ()j  > hj

= whFh: (83)
Industry employment can be easily shown to be
Lh = MhE [lhj ()] = Mh
X
j
 
kh
hj
!a
E

lhj ()j  > hj

= aMhFh =
   1

Rh
wh
:
(84)
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The labor market clearing condition sets Lh equal to the demand for labor
(inclusive of xed costs):
Lj =
X
i
Mij
 
1 + ai

F ij +
X
i
"
ai   i + 1
wjai
i
 X
h
Xihj
!#
: (85)
Thus,
wjLj =
X
i
" 
1 + ai
  
i   1
ai
i
 X
h
Xijh
!#
+
X
i
"
ai   i + 1
ai
i
 X
h
Xihj
!#
:
(86)
The price level Pj is given by
Pj =
24 a
a    + 1
X
h
Nhj
 

   1
hjwh
hj
!1 35 11  : (87)
Melitz (2003) denes industry productivity as
~h =
24X
j
NhjP
j Nhj
 
~hj
 135 1 1 : (88)
5.3 Growth rates
The growth rates of the industrys aggregates can be expressed as functions
of parameter values, changes in hj , changes in thresholds hj , and the lev-
els of bilateral trade Xhj . Dene x^  x0=x as a gross growth rate, where x
and x0 denote, respectively, the values of a variable before and after the trade
liberalization:
X^hj = w^jN^hj = w^j
 
^hj
 a
M^h; (89)
R^h =
X
j
XhjP
j Xhj
X^hj ; (90)
L^h = R^h=w^h; (91)
P^j =
"X
h
XhjP
hXhj
N^hj (^hj)
1 
(w^h)
1   
^hj
 1# 11 
: (92)
As a measurable proxy for productivity growth, we will consider the growth rate
of deated value added per worker,
R^h
L^h
p (~h)
p
 
~0h
 = R^h
w^hL^h
~0h
~h
=
~0h
~h
; (93)
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where we use the price charged by the rm with average productivity p (~h) as
a deator. (See Section 3 and Appendix A in the paper for a detailed discussion
of the appropriate choice of deator.) The growth rate ~0h=~h can be written as
~0h
~h
=
264
0@X
j
 
N 0hj
Nhj
NhjP
j0 Nhj0
!1A 1X
j
24N 0hj
Nhj
 
~0hj
~hj
! 1
Nhj
 
~hj
 1P
j0 Nhj0
 
~hj0
 1
35
375
1
 1
:
(94)
We do not have data for Nhj , but under the assumption that entry costs are
proportional to some observable destination-specic factor that is exogenous to
the model:
NhjP
j0 Nhj0
=
Xhj=

a
a +1

wjFhjP
j0 Xhj0=

a
a +1

wj0Fhj0
=
Xhj=wjLjP
j0 Xhj0=wj0Lj0
(95)
where Lj is our choice of factor exogeneous to the model. Multiplying by wj
yields GDP in the model which we use as the empirical proxy for wjLj . From
(77) and (82),
~hj =

a
a    + 1
 1
 1
hj =

a
a    + 1
 1
 1
kh (Mh)
1
a N
  1a
hj : (96)
We can approximate
Nhj
 
~hj
 1P
j0 Nhj0
 
~hj0
 1 = (Xhj=wjLj)
1 +a
aP
j0 (Xhj0=wj0Lj0)
1 +a
a
(97)
5.4 Predictions
The growth rates of the free entry condition, the price level and the labor
market clearing condition solve for the variables we need to generate predictions
(M^j ; w^j ; P^j). X
j
XhjP
nXhn
 
^hj
 a
w^j = w^h; (98)
P^j =
"X
h
XhjP
mXmj
N^hj (^hj)
1 
(w^h)
1   
^hj
 1# 11 
; (99)
w^jL^j =
A
A+B
A^+
B
A+B
B^; (100)
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where
^hj =
^hjw^h
w^j
^jj ; (101)
^jj =
w^j
P^j
; (102)
N^hj =
 
^hj
 a
M^h; (103)
and
A =
X
i
" 
1 + ai
  
i   1
ai
i
 X
h
Xijh
!#
; (104)
B =
X
i
"
ai   i + 1
ai
i
 X
h
Xihj
!#
; (105)
A^ =
1
A
X
i
24 1 + ai  i   1
ai
i
 X
h
Xijh
! d X
h
Xijh
!35 ; (106)
B^ =
1
B
X
h
24ai   i + 1
ai
i
 X
h
Xihj
! d X
h
Xihj
!35 : (107)
5.5 Other general equilibrium e¤ects
If we consider trade decits, then expenditure on industry i becomes
Eji = ji (wjLj + TDj) : (108)
Productivity thresholds are now
hji =

   1
hjiwh
Pji

wjFhji
Eji
 1
 1
; (109)
with growth rates
^hji =
^hjiw^h
w^j
^jji; (110)
^jj =
w^j
P^j
 
w^j
E^ji
! 1
 1
: (111)
The growth rate of Ej is
E^ji =
wjLj
(wjLj + TDj)
w^j +
TDj
(wjLj + TDj)
TD0j
TDj
: (112)
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6 Multi-product rms7
6.1 Assumptions
Uj =
X
i2I
ji lnQji +Aj ; (113)
where i denotes industries and j denotes countries. Let us call Qji nal goods
and Aj the numéraire good. Utility maximization yields demand functions
A = Y  Pimi and Qi = mi=Pi, where Y is total expenditure per consumer.
The homogeneous good is made with labor l and a linear technology A = lA
that is identical across countries. It is traded freely: supplying it to any market
and entering the market involves no costs. We consider equilibria in which all
countries produce positive amounts of this good, thus leading to the equalization
of wages across countries. (We normalize wages to one.)
Final goods are made with a continuum of products, which are imperfect
substitutes in demand:
Qji =
Z 1
0
Cjikdk
 1

; (114)
where  2 (0; 1) and k denotes product.
Pji =
Z 1
0
P 1 jik dk
 1
1 
: (115)
Within each product-industry, rms supply horizontally di¤erentiated vari-
etiesof the product:8
Cjik =
"X
h
Z
!2
hjik
[hjik (!) chjik (!)]

d!
# 1

; (116)
where  2 (0; 1); h denotes the products country of origin; and   1= (1  ) >
  1= (1  ); hjik (!) captures product attributes, to be discussed below.
The ideal price index associated to Cjik is
Pjik =
"X
h
Z
!2
hjik

phjik (!)
hjik (!)
1 
d!
# 1
1 
: (117)
There is a given mass of rms in each country/industry. (That is, we are in
the no-free-entry case.) After observing their  and , rms decide whether they
want to pay xed costs to select into di¤erent markets/products: (i) Firms based
in country h face a xed cost Fhji of supplying country j. (ii) Besides Fhji, in
order to supply one variety of a product in country j, country-h rms must pay
7This section draws upon Bernard, A., S.J. redding and P.K. Schott (2011): Multi-product
Firms and Trade Liberalization,Quarterly Journal of Economics, 126(3), pp.1271-1318.
8Firms are assumed to operate only within one industry.
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xed cost fhji. (Firms cannot supply more than one variety of each product by
assumption.) (iii) Fixed costs are in terms of the destination countrys labor.
There is a rm-specic constant marginal cost of production for each prod-
uct: qhjik (; hjik) = units of labor are employed in country h to supply qhjik (; hjik)
units of output of product k to market j.  is the ability(that is, productiv-
ity) of a rm. For tractability purposes, we assume  to be distributed Pareto
with shape parameter a and location parameter k . We assume the same shape
parameter for an industry across countries, but allow it to vary across industries.
The location parameter is allowed to vary across industries and countries.
Product attributes are independently distributed across the unit continuum
of symmetric products. We make the common product attributesassumption
that product attributes vary across products but are the same across countries
(hjik = hik). For tractability purposes, we assume  to be distributed Pareto
with shape parameter a and location parameter k. We assume the same shape
parameter for an industry across countries, but allow it to vary across industries.
The location parameter is allowed to vary across industries and countries.
For the varieties produced by the manufacturing industries, we assume ice-
berg transport costs, which take the form hj = (1 + chj) (1 + thj) for j 6= h
and  jj = 1. (h and j denote the exporting and importing country, respec-
tively.) chj denotes natural transport costs, and thj denotes policy-induced
trade barriers. We can safely ignore tari¤ revenue, given the quasi-linear utility
assumption above.
Fixed costs and transport costs are allowed to vary across industries and
country-pairs.
 is assumed to be the same for each product.
6.2 Firm-product protability
Optimal pricing:
phjik (; ) = hji
1

wh

: (118)
Since the production technology and elasticity of substitution  across varieties
are the same for each product, all products with productivity  have the same
price. (We can therefore dispense with the product k sub-index.)
Product revenue:
rhji (; ) = (whhji)
1 
(Pji)
 1
Eji; (119)
where Eji = ji. From (119),
rhji (; )
rhj0i (; )
=

hji
hj0i
1  j
j0

Pji
Pj0i
 1
: (120)
Product prots:
hji (; ) =
rhji (; )

  fhji: (121)
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For each rm ability , there is a zero-prot cuto¤ for product attributes,
hj (), for each source country and destination market, such that the rm
only supplies the product if   hji ():
rhji

; hji ()

= fhji: (122)
From (119) and (122),
hji () =

hji


hji
 
hji

: (123)
The higher , the lower hji (). The fraction of products supplied by industy
is rm with given  from country h to market j: 1  Z hji ().
From (119) and (122),
hji () =
"
fhji
(whhji)
1 
(Pji)
 1
Eji
# 1
 1
 1: (124)
6.3 Firm protability
Since product attributes are independently distributed across the unit contin-
uum of symmetric products, the law of large numbers implies that a rms
expected revenue across the unit continuum of products equals its expected
revenue for each product:
rhji () =
Z 1
hji()
rhji (; ) z () d: (125)
hji () =
Z 1
hji()

rhji (; )

  fhji

z () d  Fhji: (126)
hji
 
hji

= 0 =) hji: (127)
Putting together (127), (122), (126), and (120),
Z 1
hji(hji)
264
0@ 
hji

hji

1A 1   1
375 fhjiz () d = Fhji: (128)
This equation implies a recursive structure: hji

hji

is determined for each
source country and destination market independently of price indices and labor
endowments (and wages) as a function of xed costs and other parameters.
Finally, from (119) and (122) one can also show that
hji =  hjj0i

hj0i; (129)
 hjj0i =
hji
hj0i
Pj0
Pj

fhji
fhj0i
j0
j
 1
 1 

hj0i

hj0i

hji

hji
 : (130)
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6.4 Productivity
From the appendix to Bernard et al. (2011),9
~hji 
24 1
1 G

hji
 Z 1
hji
h
~hji ()
i 1
gh () d
35 1 1 ; (131)
~hji () 
"
1
1  Z hji ()
Z 1
hji()
 1z () d
# 1
 1
: (132)
~hji () =
"
k
hji ()
 a aka
a   + 1

hji ()
 a 1# 1 1 =
=
"
a
a   + 1
"
fhji
(whhji)
1 
(Pji)
 1
Eji
#
1 
# 1
 1
: (133)
~hji =
24 k
hji
! a
a
a   + 1
"
fhji
(whhji)
1 
(Pji)
 1
Eji
#Z 1
hji
dG ()
35 1 1 =(134)
=
24 k
hji
! a
a
a   + 1
"
fhji
(whhji)
1 
(Pji)
 1
Eji
# 
k
hji
!a35 1 1 =
=

a
a   + 1
fhji
Eji
 1
 1 whhji
Pji
:
~0hji
~hji
=
^hji
P^ji
= ^hji: (135)
Theory-basedindustry productivity:
~hi =
24X
j
NhjiP
nNhni
 
~hji
 135 1 1 : (136)
Implicit here is the assumption that parameter values across all the Cjik ag-
gregated in equation (114) are identical. As before, the change in ~hi is given
9See http://www.princeton.edu/~reddings/papers/mpt_webappendix_030.pdf.
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by:
~0hi
~hi
=
24 Pj N 0hjiPnN 0hni  ~0hji 1P
j0
Nhj0iP
nNhni
 
~hj0i
 1
35
1
 1
=
24X
j
24 N 0hjiPnN 0hni  ~0hji 1
NhjiP
nNhni
 
~hji
 1 NhjiPnNhni
 
~hji
 1P
j0
Nhj0iP
nNhni
 
~hj0i
 1
3535
1
 1
=
=
24PnN 0hniP
nNhni
 1X
j
24N 0hji
Nhji
 
~0hji
~hji
! 1
Nhji
 
~hji
 1P
j0 Nhj0i
 
~hj0i
 1
3535 1 1 =
=
24 X
n

N 0hni
Nhni
NhniP
mNhmi
! 1X
j
24N 0hji
Nhji
 
~0hji
~hji
! 1
Nhji
 
~hji
 1P
j0 Nhj0i
 
~hj0i
 1
3535 1 1 : (137)
Note that (see (154) below)
Xhji = Nhji
aa
(a   a) (  1)Fhji (138)
Under the assumption that market entry costs are proportional to some ob-
servable destination-specic factor that is exogenous to the model (such as mji,
GDP, population, area,...):
NhjiP
nNhni
=
(Xhji=Fhji)
(a a)( 1)
aaP
n (Xhni=Fhni)
(a a)( 1)
aa
=
Xhji=mjiP
nXhni=mni
: (139)
From (134), (150) and (159):
~hji =

a
a   + 1
fhji
Eji
 1
 1 whhji
Pji
(140)
= hjiF
 1=a
hji

a   + 1
  1
 1=a
f
1
a
hjik

a
a   + 1
 1
 1
= kM
1=a
hi N
 1=a
hji

fhji
Fhji
1=a
k (  1)1=a (a)
1
 1 (a   + 1)
 1+a
a(1 )
Nhji
 
~hji
 1
= M
 1
a
hi N
a +1
a
hji

fhji
Fhji
 1
a
k 1 k
 1
 (  1)
 1
a a (a   + 1) 
 1+a
a
(141)
Thus,
Nhji
 
~hji
 1P
j0 Nhj0i
 
~hj0i
 1 = N
a +1
a
hji

fhji
Fhji
 1
a
P
j0 N
a +1
a
hj0i

fhj0i
Fhj0i
 1
a
(142)
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Assuming that fhji = Fhji for all j, j0 and as before that market entry costs
Fhji are proportional to some observable destination-specic factor,
Nhji
 
~hji
 1P
j0 Nhj0i
 
~hj0i
 1 = N
a +1
a
hjiP
j0 N
a +1
a
hj0i
=
(Xhji=Fhji)
a +1
aP
j0 (Xhj0i=Fhj0i)
a +1
a
=
(Xhji=mji)
a +1
aP
j0 (Xhj0i=mj0i)
a +1
a
(143)
Thus,
~0hi
~hi
=
24 X
n

N^hni
Xhji=mjiP
nXhni=mni
! 1X
j
24N^hni ~0hji
~hji
! 1
(Xhji=mji)
1 +a
aP
j0 (Xhj0i=mj0i)
1 +a
a
3535 1 1
(144)
Revenue-based industry (labor) productivity:
V Ahi
Lhi
=
Rhi
Lhi
(145)
The real growth rate of industry labor productivity, deated by the price of the
average rm, is10dV Ahi
Lhi

=

Rhi
p (~hi)Lhi

=
 
R
0
hi
p (~hi)
0
L
0
hi
!
=
R^hi
L^hi
1dp (~hi) (146)
where p (~hi) is the average price of the average (domestic) rm dened as:
p (~hi) =
1
1  Z hji (~hi)
Z 1
hji(~hi)
phhik (; ) z () d (147)
=
1
1  Z hji (~hi)
Z 1
hji(~hi)
1

wh
~hi
z () d
=
  1

wh
~hi
Note that using geometric weights leads to the same result:
p (~hi) =
 
1
1  Z hji (~hi)
Z 1
hji(~hi)
phhik (; )
1 
z () d
! 1
1 
(148)
=
 
1
1  Z hji (~hi)
Z 1
hji(~hi)

1

wh
~hi
1 
z () d
! 1
1 
=
  1

wh
~hi
Thus, dV Ahi
Lhi

=
R^hi
L^hi
~0hi
~hi
(149)
10See Section 3 and Appendix A in the paper for a detailed discussion of the appropriate
choice of deator.
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6.5 Number of rms
Nhji =
 
k
hji
!a
Mhi: (150)
N^hji =
 
^hji
 a
:
6.6 Aggregate exports
Using (119) and (124),
Xhji = NhjiE

rhjij  > hji

=
Nhji
1 G

hji
 Z 1
hji
rhji () dG () =
=
Nhji
1 G

hji
 Z 1
hji
Z 1
hji()
rhji (; ) dZ () dG () =
= Nhji
ak
a

a   + 1Eji

Pji
whhji
 1 "
fhji
(whhji)
1 
(Pji)
 1
Eji
# a 1
 1
a
a   a
 
hji
a
= Nhji
a
a   a
ak
a

a   + 1 (fhji)
 a 1
 1 E
a
 1
ji

Pji
whhji
a  
hji
a : (151)
Implicit in this derivation are the following results:Z 1
hji()
 1dZ () =
ak
a

a   + 1

hji ()
 a 1 ; (152)Z 1
hji
adG () =
ak
a

a   a
 
hji
a a : (153)
These derivatives are only well dened if a > a >   1. Using the expression
for the cuto¤ hji from below (see (159)):
Xhji = Nhji
aa
(a   a) (  1)Fhji (154)
6.7 Employment by industry
lhji (; ) = hjiqhji (; ) = = rhji (; ) : (155)
lhji () = 
Z 1
hji()
rhji (; ) dZ () = rhji () : (156)
Lhji = Mhi
Z 1
hji
lhji () dG () = Xhji: (157)
Lhi = Rhi = 
X
j
Xhji: (158)
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6.8 Cuto¤
From (127), (124), and (152),
 
hji
a = Fhjia   + 1
  1


a
 1 f
 a 1
1 
hji k
 a
 E
a
1 
ji w
a
h 
a
hji
 aP aji :
(159)
6.9 Price index
Pji =
"X
h
Mh
Z 1
hji
Z 1
hji()

phji ()
hji
1 
dZ () dG ()
# 1
1 
=
=
24X
h
Nhjiak
a

a   + 1


whhji
 1 "
fhji
(whhji)
1 
(Pji)
 1
Eji
# a 1
 1
a
a   a
 
hji
a35
1
1 
=
=
"X
h
XhjiP
1 
ji E
 1
ji
# 1
1 
: (160)
6.10 Calibration
Taking growth rates of the price index,
P^
 a
ji =
X
h
XhjiP
hXhji
^
 a
hji : (161)
^hji =
^hji
P^ji
: (162)
N^hji =
 
^hji
 a
: (163)
X^hji = N^hji: (164)
R^hi =
X
j
XhjiP
j Xhji
X^hji: (165)
L^hi = R^hi: (166)
~0hji
~hji
= ^hji: (167)
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